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This thesis contains two essays covering themes in political economy. The first of these ad-
dresses the timeless theme of corruption. In it I investigate the relationship between requests
from public agencies for firms to pay bribes and firms’ input decisions. Specifically I look at
the effect that corruption has through the uncertainty that it brings to the process of procur-
ing public goods (such as permits and licenses) and the role it plays in undermining property
rights. The second chapter is much more contemporary. The second chapter addresses the
current surge in support for populist parties in Europe and aims to evaluate the role of labour
market shocks in driving current trends of populist successes.
The two papers are connected by the general theme of political economy. Both papers highlight
the relationships between political and economic forces, demonstrating that effective political
institutions and efficient markets are mutually dependent. Previous work has demonstrated
that in order for markets to work efficiently, there need to be consistent and predictable rule
governing society (Rothstein, 2011). Other authors have distinguished between ”extractive”
institutions - in which a small group in power exploits society at large - and ”inclusive” in-
stitutions - in which a wider portion of society is included in governing and the government
provides public services such as justice and education (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012). It is
noted that this latter type of institution is needed for prosperity, as it provides the conditions
for innovation and investment to occur.
The first chapter investigates how uncertainty caused by corruption affects the input choices
of firms. This is motivated by literature which finds corruption to have a damaging impact on
1
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firms’ productivity and returns to investment (O’Toole and Tarp, 2012; Gamberoni et al, 2016).
Chapter two considers the corollary of this relationship and examines how labour market shocks
affect the workings of modern democracy. Specifically, the chapter aims to contribute to the
literature looking at the rise of populism in Europe - see Algan et al (2017) and Inglehardt &
Norris (2016) for reviews. The rise of populism represents a challenge to the liberal democratic
politics that has characterised European politics in the last half century, as populist parties typ-
ically commit themselves to an unadulterated policy platform that reflects the preferences of a
particular social group, even if it is a very broadly defined one (Mudde and Rovira-Kaltwasser,
2017). Such parties once in government are also documented to engage in corruption and crony-
ism - often changing the constitution to entrench these practices in the political system - see
Muller(2017) for a full account of the actions taken by populists once in government.
Therefore we ask whether shocks to employment have an effect on increasing the support for
parties that reflect the interests of their broad group at the expense of others. The setting used
also allows me to distinguish between the effect of employment conditions on an incumbent and
opposition populist parties. This allows me to investigate whether current political trends are
due to broad cultural shifts or economic shocks. The setting of populist forming governments
in European democracies is becoming more common as more countries elect populists into ma-
jority or coalition governments. Therefore by looking at the case of Hungary, we may be able
to unearth relationships that help us to understand events in these countries too.
In the first chapter I find that more frequent bribery is associated with lower investment and a
reliance on temporary labour. By deterring investment, bribe frequency is likely to reduce firm
productivity. I also find that a higher frequency of bribes reduces the amount of permanent
labour hired by firms. This suggests that when bribery is more frequent, there will be fewer op-
portunities for secure and gainful employment. As a result, the gains to effective anti-corruption
drives will be two-fold as firms will be more willing to invest and to create permanent jobs.
It also highlights the effectiveness of anti-corruption policies that focus on procedural aspects
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- for example by allowing people to pay extra for faster processing when applying for public
goods, as the predictability of the process is important. These types of polices are likely to be
more effective than economy wide measures such as India’s recent demonetisation drive, which
has if anything exacerbated uncertainty.
In chapter 2 I find that employment shocks do affect political outcomes. However, the ex-
tent to which it makes political institutions more effective is debatable. I find evidence that in
the case of Hungary, improving economic conditions reduces support for the incumbent populist
party and for the established liberal opposition. I argue that as economic conditions improve,
economic considerations become less important in how citizens evaluate political parties and
how they would perform in government. As a result, cultural considerations will play a larger
role in citizens’ evaluations when economic conditions are better, as income and subsistence
consumption considerations are less important and the opportunity costs of supporting a pop-
ulist party is lower. This does not have to be a good thing however. As noted, populist parties
have potential to be extremely divisive and their success typically marks a move towards a ma-
joritarian form of democracy. This typically results in the interests of party supporters being
prioritised, which is likely to be detrimental in the long run.
References
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Chapter 1
Labour, Investment and Firms’
Experience of Bribery
Abstract
Corruption is widely acknowledged as being a hindrance to many indicators of economic per-
formance at the micro and macro level. This paper builds on previous literature by considering
whether the frequency with which firms form corrupt agreements affects their choice of inputs.
We believe that the frequency of bribe payments has a distinct effect on firm behaviour due
to the uncertainty it creates and the its weakening of property rights. We look at the effect of
bribe frequency on investment and hiring decisions to draw conclusions about the effect on pro-
ductivity and labour markets. By drawing on firm level performance surveys from Argentina,
this paper is able to find evidence to show that as bribes are demanded more frequently from
firms, firms will invest less and use more temporary labour as a share of their work force.
1.1 Introduction
Corruption is a social ill that affects people all around the globe. Its effects are systematic and
diverse. This can be clearly seen in the developing world, where corruption has lead to $1tr
being stolen from the world’s poorest economies each year (Al Jazeera, 2018). In extreme cases
5
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this has lead to governments being unable to tackle major disease outbreaks and left corrupt
governments unable to win the support of their citizens in the war on terrorism. Corruption is
a perennial development issue and something to which the poorest citizens of the developing
world are the most vulnerable. However, corruption whether at home or abroad has signifi-
cant effects for the developed world too. Perceptions of corruption and of undue influence by
financiers undermines trust in political institutions and reduces electoral participation. Cor-
ruption in the developing world can also exacerbate inequalities in the developed world. For
example, the use of major cities such as London as a safe haven for dirty money from overseas
has been shown to push up house prices and rents (Al Jazeera, 2018; Badarinza & Ramadorai,
2016). This can lead to widening housing inequalities and can contribute to increasing political
polarisation.
In the last two decades research has highlighted the economic damage done by bureaucratic
corruption, with numerous contributions looking at the effects of corruption on firm behaviour
and performance - See Fisman & Svennson (2007) and Djankov & Sequiera (2014) for examples.
If firms have to engage in bureaucratic processes in order to get things done, we would expect
that a corrupt bureaucracy should affect how firms operate. Here we aim to evaluate the effect
of corruption on firms’ decisions to use capital and labour. In order to do this we will be using
micro-level data on bribery, taken from World Bank enterprise performance surveys conducted
in Argentina.
Corruption has been a pervasive issue in Argentina. In 2006 - the first year covered by our
data - Argentina ranked 93rd out of 163 countries on Transparency International’s Corruption
Perceptions Index (Transparency International, 2018a). By 2010 - when the second wave of our
data was collected - the country had fallen down the 105th place (Transparency International,
2018b). Corruption in Argentina was recently highlighted by the trial of Argentina’s former
president - Christina Fernandez de Kirchner - on charges of corruption (Al Jazeera, 2019).
Kirchner is accused of awarding over 50 public works projects at inflated prices to businessmen
close to her.
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The BEEPS data set contains information about the frequency with which firms are actu-
ally asked to pay bribes, allowing us to avoid the problems associated with perceptions indices.
With this data it was possible to construct a measure of how often firm’s interactions with the
state end in bribes being demanded. We then use this measure in a series of OLS and 2SLS
regressions to estimate its effect on the investment and employment decisions of firms.
Previous work has largely focused on the impact of corruption on macro-level economic in-
dicators, such as investment, trade and GDP growth (see Mauro, 1995; Hodge et al, 2011,
Mendez & Sepulveda, 2006). Whilst there has been some work looking into the impact of
corruption on firms, this has focused on the size of bribes, largely treating a bribe as analogous
to a tax (see Fisman & Svensson, 2007 and Djankov & Sequiera, 2014). We consider the possi-
bility that the actual process of dealing with bribe taking public agents will in itself affect the
behaviour of firms, regardless of the size of the bribe paid. Negotiating corrupt arrangements
takes time and is not guaranteed to result in firms getting what they want from the process.
Furthermore, corrupt arrangements are not legally enforceable, meaning that firms engaging
in corrupt activities risk termination of the corrupt agreements as well as relevant penalties if
they are caught by the authorities (Bardhan, 1997). As a result we believe that corruption in-
troduces uncertainty that needs to be considered when making operating decisions. The choice
of inputs used by the firms is an important one. Looking at these decisions can give us an
insight into firm productivity and potential for growth, as well as the impact of corruption on
employment opportunities.
Our main contribution here is to examine how the frequency with which firms are asked for
bribes - and the resulting uncertainty associated with the process - affect the behaviour of firms.
The aim is to deepen our understanding of how corruption affects economic outcomes at the
level of the firm. We aim to move away from other parts of the literature that focus on the
size of bribes, treating bribery as similar to a tax. Instead we aim to look at the effect of the
actual process of making corrupt deals with the public agents.
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Further to this we aim to expand the literature on firms’ decision making by looking at the
choice of inputs. Our theoretical model predicts that when bribes are extorted more frequently,
firms will aim to make their inputs as flexible as possible. As a result firms should invest less
and use more temporary labour. This raises the prospect of potential employment considera-
tions that should be taken into account when devising anti-corruption policy.
In the following section we review the previous literature, giving an overview of how corruption
affects both the behaviour of firms and the overall economic climate in which these firms oper-
ate. Section 3 then describes the data used in the empirical part of this study. Section 4 offers
a theoretical model. In section 5 we consider our empirical strategy, as well as our identification
strategy before presenting our results in section 6. Finally, section 7 concludes.
1.2 Literature Review
The term “corruption” is a very intuitive yet vague one. A useful definition for our purposes is
provided by Khan, who describes corruption as “behaviour that deviates from the formal rules
of conduct governing the actions of someone in a position of public authority because of private
- regarding motives such as wealth, power, or status” (Khan, 1996, p12). It is important to
distinguish between grand corruption - which occurs at the highest level of political decision
making - and bureaucratic corruption which occurs in the bodies tasked with implementing
policies. It is this latter form of corruption that is commonly encountered in daily life for many
citizens of the developing world. While ”corruption” can be considered an umbrella term for
several practices including extortion, nepotism and embezzlement, this paper shall focus on
corruption manifesting as bribery. This involves payments either in money or in kind being
made to public officials to induce them to put their own interests (along with those of the bribe
payer) before those of the agency employing them (Amundsen, 1999; Rose-Ackerman, 1975).
The empirical literature surrounding corruption can generally be divided into a macro strand
- largely focusing on the effect of corruption on economic growth and determinants such as
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investment and political stability - and a micro strand which mainly looks at how corruption
affects the performance of firms and the quality of the business environment in which they
operate.
1.2.1 Macro
Early empirical work on corruption looked at the direct effects of corruption on GDP growth
at the country level and channels through which this impact might occur indirectly. These
channels include investment, human capital accumulation, political instability, trade openness
and the size of government (Mauro, 1995; Mo, 2001; Pellegrini and Gerlagh, 2004). This early
work is unanimous in finding a negative relationship between corruption and economic growth
- thus dispelling the theory that corruption can aid growth by allowing firms to circumvent
unnecessary regulation (Cooray and Schneider, 2018).
The channels mentioned above are generally found to be significant ways through which cor-
ruption affects growth. These channels are means through which corruption affects growth
indirectly. For example, corruption is shown to reduce the level of investment in a country,
which in turn limits its growth prospects (Delgado et al, 2014; Zakharov, 2018).
However, the evidence around the relative importance of each channel is slightly more mixed.
While the investment channel is consistently found to be positive, the human capital channel is
not always found to be significant (Pellegrini and Gerlagh; Swalaheen, 2011). Moreover, there
is also some evidence that corruption may in fact foster growth through some channels. Hodge
et al (2011) find that although corruption reduces growth by adversely affecting investment,
human capital and political stability, by reducing government size and fostering trade openness,
corruption could indirectly increase economic growth. However, the positive effects found for
these channels are generally rather small. On the other hand, other work finds the effect of
trade openness to be negligible (Swalaheen, 2011).
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The relative importance of each channel is also sensitive to the choice of methodology. Swala-
heen (2011) uses fixed effects models and GMM to estimate the effects of all of the aforemen-
tioned channels and corruption on growth. In fixed effects regression models Swalaheen finds
strong evidence of investment and trade openness being significant and positive determinants
of growth, with both effect being large. However when GMM models are used, investment,
corruption and government expenditure as a share of GDP turn out to be the most important
determinants of growth, while the role of trade openness is much smaller
A potential problem with earlier work was that it looked at data on large pools of coun-
tries, thus obtaining results that reflected average effects in countries with different political
and institutional dynamics.
Several papers have subsequently looked at the effects of corruption by running models fordif-
ferent groups of countries. The exact groups differ, with distinctions made between ’free’ or
’not free’ (Mendez and Sepulveda, 2006), stable and unstable (Gamberoni et al, 2016), and
countries with low and high quality institutions (Aidt et al, 2008; De Rosa et al, 2010). The
conclusions drawn from these studies do not provide much in the way of consensus. While some
work finds that corruption is more detrimental in environments with lower quality institutions
(Gamberoni et al, 2016), other work finds the opposite and uses this evidence to suggest that
corruption can indeed ’grease the wheels’ of growth by allowing firms to by-pass dysfunctional
bureaucracies (Aidt et al, 2008; De Rosa et al, 2010). None the less, these studies are valuable
in so far as they highlight the importance of wider institutional factors in determining the
effects of corruption on economic outcomes.
However, these previous studies lead us to somewhat superficial conclusions as one would gen-
erally expect the institutional environment to affect economic relationships within a polity.
Ideally one would want to establish a better understanding of what drives these differences,
that is, which institutional features matter most in determining the effects of corruption on
economic performance.
1.2. Literature Review 11
One hypothesis is presented in a theoretical form by Blackburn and Forgues-Puccio (2009).
They present a model, in which research and development is carried out exclusively by firms.
In order to carry out research activities, firms have to obtain licenses and permits from gov-
ernment officials. Naturally, officials can require bribes to prevent an application either being
blocked or held up for a long period, which may result in another firm patenting the innova-
tion first. The model allows agencies to coordinate their corrupt activity, affecting aggregate
outcomes in the process.
The effects of corruption are found to differ depending on whether firms coordinate their bribe
extraction (Blackburn and Forgues-Puccio, 2009). The intuition is that if a public agent de-
mands a large bribe from a firm, then there will be externalities for other public agencies. Firms
will effectively face higher fixed costs as a result of the bribe payment meaning that they are
less likely to make profits. This will lead to them being either less able or less willing to pay
bribes to other public agencies in the future. However, coordination between public agencies
makes it possible for agencies to internalise these externalities and extract bribes at a rate
that is less detrimental to businesses. Thus a centralised bribe-taking regime imposes a lesser
burden on firms.
This hypothesis draws on one of the seminal theoretical papers on corruption from Shleifer
and Vishny (1993). This work distinguishes between centralised and decentralised bribe taking
and offer some interesting historical examples. One such example given is the Soviet Union,
in which corruption was managed by local branches of the Communist Party. Under this sys-
tem, bureaucrats were tacitly allowed to extort bribes, but only for certain services and with
values limited to a proportion of the value of the service in question. They contrast this with
corruption where there is no central organisation and bribes are extracted at the whim of the
bureaucrat. This distinction goes some way to explaining why the effects of corruption differ
between countries, as the degree of certainty and predictability around bribe payments may
make firms more willing to invest. The element of uncertainty is a key distinction between
corruption and tax. Even if bribery occurs with predictable frequency and size, corrupt agree-
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ments are effectively unenforceable if the bureaucrat should fail to provide the service agreed
upon and the firms can face penalties if the corrupt agreement comes to light. As such it can
be seen that bribery inherently involves some degree of uncertainty for firms.
1.2.2 Micro
The current focus of the corruption literature is on the ways in which corruption can affect the
behaviour and performance of firms.
An early contribution to the empirical micro literature comes from Fisman and Svensson (2007)
who examine the effects of corruption and taxation on the growth of firms in Uganda. They
find corruption to have a strong and negative effect on the growth of firms. Meanwhile, the
effect of taxation is negative but to a much smaller extent. A shortcoming of this paper is that
the authors do not attempt to explain why the effects of taxation are weaker than those of
corruption. The framework provided by Shleifer and Vishny (1993) indicates that the different
effects of corruption and taxation may stem from the uncertainty surrounding corrupt agree-
ments.
Uncertainty created by corruption is shown to be an important determinant of firms’ behaviour.
A survey of firms in Brazil highlights that corruption is the most commonly perceived barrier
to entry (Campos et al, 2010). Firms reported uncertainty around what bribes to pay and who
to bribe. For established firms, corruption can also create uncertainty by undermining property
rights. Paunov (2016) looks at the effect of corruption on the probability of obtaining a patent
or an ISO 9000 quality certificate, which certifies that the firm meets a certain organisational
standard. Corruption is shown to reduce the chances of a firm holding a quality certificate -
though not a patent, which is awarded on the basis of internationally recognised standards.
This should help illustrate the barrier to investment presented by corruption. Furthermore, it
is found that small and medium sized firms feel the effects of corruption more than large and
foreign owned firms do.
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This last result fits neatly with the findings of O’Toole and Tarp (2012) who investigated
the effect of corruption on the efficiency of investment in a sample of developing and transition
countries. While corruption reduces both the level of investment and marginal per unit returns
to investment, the effect is most pronounced for Small and Medium sized Enterprises (SME’s),
with large and foreign owned firms experiencing no effect of corruption on investment. This
may be due to corruption increasing the costs of innovation and development, as well as reduc-
ing the certainty of making returns on investments.
Misallocation of resources is another means through which corruption can affect the output
and productivity of firms. Gameroni et al (2016) look at the impact of corruption on input
misallocation by examining the relationship between bribe frequency and the dispersion of the
marginal revenue productivities of labour and capital across firms. More frequent corruption
is found to lead to greater resource misallocation, with the effect being stronger in smaller and
less stable countries. Evidence from Spain shows that sectors with the highest levels of resource
misallocation are also those in which corruption occurs most frequently (Garcia-Santana et al,
2016).
Reduced productivity of firms may stem from corruption diverting managerial resources away
from the supervision and coordination of productive processes (Dal Bo and Rossi, 2007). This
leads to firms employing more factors to compensate for their less coordinated use. Firms may
also undertake costly actions in order to avoid the uncertainties associated with corruption.
Evidence from South Africa shows that when when choosing between shipping goods from the
ports of Durban or Maputo, the higher levels of corruption at Maputo (with a mean bribe three
times that that of Durban) caused firms to disproportionately use the port of Durban, even
if the firm is closer to Maputo, thus increasing transport costs Djankov and Sequeira (2014).
In extreme cases firms would incur transport costs three time higher than the mean bribe of
Maputo in order to avoid this port.
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The organisation of this paper is as follows: section 3 provides a description of the data set
and an explanation of the empirical strategy used. Section 4 then presents the results of the
regression analysis, before section 5 offers a discussion of the results and concluding remarks.
1.3 Data Description
Following the previous discussion of the literature to date, this paper aims to test the effects
of bribe frequency on firms’ investment and employment decisions. Whilst research has looked
at the effect of the size of bribes on various outcomes, there is less research looking at the
frequency of bribe payments, even though there is good reason to think that this may have
an effect- independent of that of bribe size (see Gamberoni et al, 2016). For example higher
frequency may constitute time lost by managers who have to deal with bureaucrats, and a
higher level of uncertainty when applying for permits to operate capital (Shleifer and Vishny,
1993).
In order to examine this hypothesis we shall be using data taken from Business Environment
and Enterprise Performance Surveys (BEEPS) conducted by the World Bank. In particular,
we use data from Argentina. The data covers two survey waves, conducted in 2006 and 2010
in 5 regions of Argentina. The data covers firms from 18 industries. These are primarily man-
ufacturing firms, but firms in the hospitality and retail sectors are also included.
The surveys ask business managers a wide range of questions about the nature of their busi-
ness, how conducive conditions in their country are to carrying out business and how well
their business performs. Of particular interest were several questions that asked firms about
experiences of bribery when dealing with specific public offices. Specifically, firms are asked if
they were visited by tax authorities or applied for any of the following; a water connection, an
electricity connection, an import license, an operations licence or a construction license. If the
firm did interact with any of these authorities, they were then asked whether ‘an informal gift
or payment (was) expected or requested’. These are followed up by questions asking managers
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to estimate either the average size of bribes paid or the total amount spent each year on bribe
payments.
It is worth noting that the surveys are designed to try and elicit truthful answers from re-
spondents, therefore questions are phrased in such a way as to allow respondents to avoid
incriminating themselves. For example, instead of asking managers how much their firm pays
in bribes each year they are asked ‘On average, what percentage of total annual sales, or es-
timated total annual value, do establishments like this one pay in informal payments or gifts
to public officials?’. Similarly, rather than asking if the firm paid a bribe to obtain a licence,
firms are asked if ”a gift or informal payment (was) expected”, thus putting the emphasis
on the actions of the public official and avoiding the issue of whether the bribe was actually
paid. For those interested, the full questionnaire (along with the datasets) are available at
http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/data. The surveys also contain a lot of useful control vari-
ables and data on firm growth - our main dependant variable. Density plots showing the
distribution of the dependant variables and the bribe frequency data are presented in appendix
A. Summary statistics for the variables used in our models are presented in appendix B.
An advantage of this data is that it allows us to avoid using the perceptions indices that
were common to many of the macro studies discussed earlier. These studies would typically
use Transparency Internationals Corruption Perception Indices or data from the International
Country Risk Guide produced by the PRS group. These measures tried to gauge the level
of corruption in a polity by interviewing local business managers about the damage they feel
corruption does to their business. Whilst perceptions can be an important determinant of
economic decision making, we feel that our data on specific instances of bribery is more ap-
propriate here. Not only could perceptions be influenced by irrelevant information, but asking
people about the harm done by corruption does not allow one to distinguish the effects of bribe
incidence and bribe size.
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1.4 Theory
In this section we aim to present a theoretical model to explain the effect of bribe frequency
on firms’ investment decisions. We use the model to demonstrate that higher levels of bribe
frequency lead to a higher level of uncertainty about the level of effective demand. Our model
follows that of Bond et al (2007), who use adjustment costs and demand uncertainty to ex-
plain why firms invest episodically, rather than continuously over time. In our model, corrupt
public agents can extort bribes from firms. We consider this as an exogenous shock to effective
demand which we allow to take values between 0 and 1. We treat bribe payments as shocks
to effective demand, as bribes can be seen as negative revenue shocks. The intuition of the
model is that shocks to effective demand require firms to adjust their capital stocks. However
this incurs costs, as we shall see shortly. Therefore in an environment with uncertain effective
demand, firms will aim to minimise these adjustment costs by substituting capital with more
flexible inputs such as labour.
We characterise the firm as follows. First we assume an isoelastic, stochastic demand func-




Where Qt is output in period t, Pt is price in time t, η is the price elasticity of demand, whilst
Xt is the level of effective demand in time t. The frequency of bribery, σ, is the only source of
uncertainty in the model, and affects revenue through Q. The log of Xtis assumed to follow a
random walk with drift. On the production side, firms produce an output good using capital
and labour and have the production function
Qt = (Kt + It)
βL1−βt (1.2)
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Labour Lt is hired at the wage rate w and can be either augmented or diminished without any
adjustment costs. This is an importance difference to the capital stock Kt, which is costly to
adjust. Capital is inherited from the previous period and the firm can chose to invest in or sell
off capital in response to demand shocks. Thus the level of capital in time t - Ktis equal to
Kt−1+It−1, where I−t is the amount of investment. While capital is assumed not to depreciate,
it is costly to adjust. Adjustment costs originate from the fact that firms are often unable to
sell capital for the price that it was purchased at. Bond et al (2007) note that this may be due
to issues of asymmetric information in second-hand goods markets. Here the difference between
the price at which capital is purchased and the price at which it is sold is denoted as b. As
an example, if an item of capital can be sold at 90% of the original purchase price, then b is 0.1.
There are multiple forms of adjustment cost that the firm could be subject to. For brevity
and clarity of intuition we focus on the case of quadratic adjustment costs, as these demon-
strate our point without the caveats associated with the case of fixed adjustment costs. The









Here the size of adjustment costs varies with the size of the firm and leads to the net revenue
function:
PtQt −G(It, Kt) − It − wLt (1.4)
Our adjustment cost function shows that larger adjustments to capital are penalised more than
smaller ones. Crucially, the preceding description of adjustment costs shows that there are
costs associated with reducing capital holdings as well as investing. This means that any ad-
justment of capital holdings in response to changes in effective demand will incur costs and
reduce the firm’s net revenue, as shown above. While this specification does not allow an op-
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timal level of It to be found, Bond et al (2007) use stochastic dynamic programming methods
with simulated investment data to estimate the relationship between demand uncertainty and
optimal investment rates. Their simulations show a strong and negative relationship between
investment rates and uncertainty and that the difference between optimal investment in the
case with adjustment costs and the benchmark case without adjustments costs also increases
with demand uncertainty.
This forms the theoretical reasoning for our expected empirical relationship. To summarise, we
expect that when uncertainty about the level of corruption is higher, the level of investment
undertaken by firms will be lower, as forward-looking firms aim to minimise the costs associated
with adjusting to variations in bribery. We expect that a higher frequency of bribes will lead
to greater uncertainty as the firm is entering into more illegal contracts with public agents. A
feature of these contracts is that they are not enforceable. This means that even if a bribe is
paid, the firm cannot be certain that it will actually receive the desired good or service, as the
agreement does not offer any means of recourse if the public agent does not honour their end of
the arrangement (Bardhan, 1997). Even if the agreement is honoured by the public agent, the
firm can later be penalised for entering into it. Therefore if the agreement comes to light then
the firm may have corruptly obtained permits revoked and incur other penalties. This means
as that as the firm enters into more corrupt agreements, the degree of uncertainty surrounding
the operation of the firm increases as ever more opportunities emerge for the firm to incur costs,
for example - from penalties or the loss of corruptly obtained permits. In our model firms can
manage this uncertainty by substituting away from capital inputs to labour. In the following
section we use firm level data from Argentina to look for empirical evidence of this relationship.
1.5 Empirical Strategy
We can measure the frequency of bribery using data on bribes requested when dealing with
individual public agencies. The questions in the BEEPS asking about applications and bribes
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produce dummy variables, making it possible to obtain the proportion of the interactions with
public agencies that resulted in a bribe being requested, as shown:
ΣBribeij/ΣAppij (1.5)
Where Appij is binary between 1 if firm i applied for good j and 0 otherwise, and Bribeij is
equal to 1 if firms 1 had to pay a bribe in order to obtain good j and 0 otherwise. This gives
us the proportion of licence and permit applications that result in a bribe being requested.
We multiply this by 100 to obtain a percentage. This is likely to be an underestimate of how
often the firm is asked to pay bribes as our data only includes questions about applications for
certain licences and permits. However this does not include information on bribes demanded
on a day to day basis, say from the local police force (see Transparency International, 2017).
In order to estimate the effect of bribe frequency we put this measure into a regression model
as shown below.
LogInvi = β0 + β1Frequencyi + β2λr + β3ψi + εi (1.6)
Where LogInvi is the log of investment. In our regression we shall estimate the effect of
bribe frequency on three dependant variables. The first of these being log investment, which
is the log of expenditures on capital and machinery in the current period. The following two
dependant variables are the logs of the firm’s permanent staff and the temporary staff numbers.
The term Frequencyi refers to our independent variable of interest described above, which
-in order to approximate the level of uncertainty caused by bribery - measures how often the
firm is asked to pay bribes.
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Λr is a vector of environmental controls, which includes region dummies and a measure of
the quality of courts. This variable is based on the BEEPS respondents’ evaluations of the
quality of the court system. Firms were asked to rate the extent to which dealings with the
courts represent an obstacle to running their business. The responses are coded on a scale of 0
to 4, with 0 representing no obstacle and 4 representing a major obstacle. Previous literature
(see Gamberoni et al, 2016; Aidt et al, 2008) has highlighted the importance of political and
legal institutions in determining the effects of corruption on firms’ behaviour by affecting the
legal protections available to them when dealing with public agents. In this case we would
expect higher court quality to be associated with higher investment for any level of bribery.
Therefore this has been included as a measure of quality of the institutional environment.
Ψi is a vector containing two firm-specific controls - foreign ownership and the value of firm
sales prior to the survey. Previous work has shown that foreign owned firms are typically less
affected by corruption than smaller firms (Zakharov, 2019). This may be due to such firms
being larger than local competitors and having more financial resources with which to resist
demands for bribes. Due to their connections overseas (and potentially their size) such firms
are also able to credibly threaten to leave the country if they are required to pay bribes (Bai et
al, 2017). As a result we include a measure of foreign ownership in our model, which measures
the percentage of the firm owned by foreign shareholders. The size of the firm is likely to
affect the level of investment and employment undertaken by the firms. Sales in the period
three years before the firm was interviewed are used to control for the initial size of the firm.
There is also mixed evidence on the relationship between corruption and firm size, with some
evidence that larger firms experience less bribery for the reasons described above and other
work arguing that smaller firms are less subject to bribery as they do not have to comply with
as many regulations as larger firms (Hanousek and Kochanova 2015). As a result, we control
for firm size in the model.
The instrument that we use as part of our identification strategy is the average value of bribe
frequency for the firms industry-region. Previous literature has noted that a firm’s experience of
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corruption may be related to firm characteristics (Fisman and Svennson, 2007; Bai et al, 2017),
while reporting error may affect the quality of the data. To avoid this source of endogeneity
we follow a similar approach to Fisman and Svennson (2007) and instrument for the frequency
with which each firm pays bribes with the average rate for the firm’s industry and location.
This allows the data to reflect variations in bribe frequency resulting from industry traits and
the varying abilities of bureaucrats in different regions to extract bribes, whilst removing noise
caused by firms’ unobserved idiosyncrasies.
After having looked at the effects of bribe frequency on investment, we shall turn to the ques-
tion of labour input. More specifically we shall run the regression model above with labour
outcomes as our dependant variables. Firstly we shall look at the effect on the log of full-time
staff employed. For reasons that will be outlined in more detail in the result section, we shall
also look at the effect of bribe frequency on the log of temporary labour employed. This effect
will be interesting to estimate as it is possible that if the firm aims to reduce costs or risk by
substituting capital for labour then it is also plausible that the firm may substitute permanent
labour for temporary labour.
We decided to omit certain variables from the empirical model. Among these are the age
of firms - which may have indicated the probability of bribe takers being aware of the firm -
productivity and the size of bribes. This final variable was very problematic as respondents
could choose to give their answers in one of two ways; either they could give bribe values as a
share of their average sales, or they could give the absolute value of bribes paid each year. It
should have been possible to combine these - by dividing bribe figures given in absolute terms
by the total value by sales in the previous period to obtain the value of bribes as a share of
sales.This could then be merged with the answers initially given as a share. However there
appeared to be systematic difference between the two variables, which raised questions about
the quality of the answers given.
This phenomenon has been documented in other work. In a sample of West African firms,
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bribe size was found to be between 4 and 15 times higher when reported as a percentage of
sales than in monetary terms (Clarke, 2011). A similar issue is found when firms are asked to
estimate security costs and losses due to power outages. This suggests that the cause of this is
not related to the sensitivity of corruption as a topic. It is possible that managers struggle to
accurately calculate percentages when amounts are small or may not do explicit calculations
at all - instead giving answers that sound small in percentage terms despite being large in
monetary terms (Clarke, 2011).
The fact that firms struggle to estimate amounts such as security costs accurately in percent-
age terms suggests that issues with bribe size estimates are not due to the nature of questions
about corruption. As noted in section 1.3, the BEEPS surveys are designed in such a way as
to encourage truthful answers. Therefore, we can use data on bribe frequency as the quality of
the data should not be be affected the sensitive nature of the topic. Furthermore, by its nature,
data on bribe frequency is not subject to the estimation issues that affect data on the size of
bribes. While there may be reporting error, our identification strategy aims to control for this.
1.5.1 Identification strategy
As noted previously, it is possible that the results of the investment regression may have reflected
bias resulting from reverse causality. It is also very hard to rule out endogeneity occurring from
measurement error or omitted variables. The BEEPS surveys go to great lengths to frame ques-
tions in such a way that respondents can talk about their experiences of corruption without
incriminating themselves. This is why the questions often ask about ”businesses like yours” or
ask what the respondent considers to be normal. In some countries the surveys have even used
a system where the respondent is asked two questions simultaneously; one of these asks the
respondent to corroborate a basic fact, whilst the other is a question about the firm’s exposure
to bribery. The respondent then flips a coin to determine which question they answer. The
result of the coin flip is not disclosed to the interviewer. This means that the respondent can
talk more freely about corruption as it cannot be demonstrated that they were in fact talking
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Figure 1.1: Scatter Plot of Industry-Region bribery against Investment
about corruption, let alone suggesting their own involvement in illegal activity. None the less,
there is still potential for there to be inaccuracies in our firm-level data. As a result we devise an
identification strategy based on that of Fisman and Svensson (2007). The instrument we shall
be using for bribe frequency is the region-industry average of bribe frequency. This means that
we have an observation per industry in each region and a total of 31 unique observations. This
is fewer than we may wish and is in part due to some industries not operating in certain regions.
Clearly the industry-region average bribe frequency will be related to that experienced by the
majority of firms in the industry-region and so should be a strong instrument. There is little
reason to suspect that there should be any correlation between the industry-region average and
the error in reporting as we should expect to be idiosyncratic to the firm or the staff member
completing the survey. To be useful as an instrument it is vital that there is no relationship
between our instrument and log investment beyond the extent that the instrument is correlated
with the actual frequency of bribes, say due to a particular region having a bad reputation.
Our OLS results showed that there was little evidence for this as most of our region dummies
were insignificant. Furthermore, figure 1.1 suggests that there is no relationship, as we have
the industry-region average bribe frequency on the x axis and the level of investment on the y
axis. As can be seen there is no clear pattern.
24 Chapter 1. Labour, Investment and Firms’ Experience of Bribery
Table 1.1: OLS, Y: Log Investment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Bribe Frequency -0.00540 -0.00579 -0.00390 -0.00609
(0.00430) (0.00429) (0.00407) (0.00418)
Court Quality -0.0509 -0.0408 -0.0427
(0.0685) (0.0629) (0.0699)




Buenos Aires 1.243∗∗∗ 1.248∗∗∗ 0.709∗∗ 0.441
(0.304) (0.302) (0.299) (0.271)
Rosario 0.439 0.468 0.351 0.0842
(0.378) (0.379) (0.370) (0.394)
Mendoza 0.611 0.606 0.454 0.298
(0.376) (0.375) (0.372) (0.380)
Cordoba 0.870∗∗ 0.860∗∗ 0.729∗∗ 0.702∗∗
(0.357) (0.354) (0.352) (0.355)
Constant 12.50∗∗∗ 12.60∗∗∗ 12.57∗∗∗ 12.82∗∗∗
(0.279) (0.295) (0.289) (0.262)
N 567 567 566 479
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
1.6 Results
Initially we use OLS regressions to estimate the effects of bribe frequency on the rate of in-
vestment among firms in our sample of Argentinian firms. In table 1 we can see the results of
this regression. Note that robust standard errors appear in parentheses throughout. The OLS
specifications without robust standard errors can be found in appendix C.
In table 1.1 we have five environment variables, namely the region dummies and the variable
measuring the quality of courts. We then have three firm specific variables showing the degree
of foreign ownership, the volume of sales in the previous period and our corruption variable
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- the proportion of licence and infrastructure applications ending in a bribe being requested.
Our results show that the log of investment is largely independent of environmental factors,
with the dummy for Cordoba being the only significant regional dummy, the coefficient showing
that the log of investment is 70% higher than in the omitted region - Chaco. We can see that
the size of the firm as measured in previous period sales is by far the most significant variable,
with a positive relationship that is significant at the 1% level. Similarly the degree of foreign
ownership is highly significant, although the coefficient is notably smaller than that of firm
size. Our main variable of interest the frequency of bribe taking- is not significant here as
almost all the variation is either random or explained by firm size and foreign ownership. A
potential reason for this could be reverse causality, as the very process of investing may create
opportunities for bribe payments to be demanded. For example, with reference to our data
set we may conceive of an application for a water connection as a part of the process of a
firm investing in its estates. This may create an upward bias that counteracts the negative
relationship we may expect between bribe frequency and investment. We shall return to this
shortly in the next section.As the effect on labour is more ambiguous, we estimate the effect of
bribe frequency on employment using the same OLS framework as above.
Table 1.2 shows us that - much as in the investment regression - most of the variation in the
log of full time employment is explained by the level of foreign ownership and by the size of
the firm. However there is a little bit more regional variation than last time as firms use more
labour in both Buenos Aires and Cordoba, in contrast to Rosario, Mendoza and Chaco, the
omitted dummy variable. In this instance bribe frequency is actually significant, albeit at the
10% level only. The effect is negative, thus reflecting the complementary relationship between
labour and capital. However, in table 1.3 we can see that this effect disappears when, rather
than looking at the effect on permanent labour, we look at the effect on temporary labour-
workers who do not have a permanent contract with the firm. This type of labour may be more
appealing when bribery is more frequent as it is more flexible, making it easier for the firm to
adjust when necessary.
26 Chapter 1. Labour, Investment and Firms’ Experience of Bribery
Table 1.2: OLS, Y:Permanent Labour
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Bribe Frequency -0.00410∗∗ -0.00401∗∗ -0.00231 -0.00338∗
(0.00202) (0.00203) (0.00186) (0.00192)
Court Quality 0.0171 0.0149 -0.0129
(0.0374) (0.0351) (0.0387)




Buenos Aires 1.292∗∗∗ 1.291∗∗∗ 0.964∗∗∗ 0.685∗∗∗
(0.178) (0.178) (0.184) (0.205)
Rosario 0.735∗∗∗ 0.729∗∗∗ 0.680∗∗∗ 0.359
(0.213) (0.213) (0.214) (0.247)
Mendoza 0.297 0.297 0.233 0.0693
(0.208) (0.208) (0.208) (0.242)
Cordoba 0.851∗∗∗ 0.853∗∗∗ 0.792∗∗∗ 0.620∗∗
(0.220) (0.220) (0.222) (0.256)
Constant 3.080∗∗∗ 3.048∗∗∗ 3.015∗∗∗ 3.374∗∗∗
(0.163) (0.178) (0.182) (0.204)
N 867 867 866 700
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Argentinian labour law demonstrates the flexibility of the Argentinian labour market. The
Law on Contract of Employment (Ley de Contrato de Trabajo, LCT) is the main source of
labour law in Argentina, according to the International Labour Organisation (ILO). This piece
of legislation outlines the rights and responsibilities of employers and employees, including the
terms under which employment can be terminated. According to the ILO the employer; ”may
unilaterally terminate the contract of employment with a valid reason for such termination,
connected with the conduct of the worker, or on economic grounds owing to lack or shortage
of work, or force majeure. In fact, he/she may terminate the contract of employment on any
grounds, or with no grounds whatsoever provided he/she gives notice and makes a severance
payment” (ILO, 2017). These severance payments vary from half a months pay to a whole
months pay for each year of service. These provisions largely confirm the assumption about
the ease with which workers can be dismissed, although the requirement of a notice period and
severance payment can be seen as a small adjustment cost. However, as these costs are linked
the period of service, it is plausible that temporary labour is cheaper to dispose of and thus
preferable to firms, especially for those that use low-skilled labour that requires little training.
In this set of results we can see that the frequency of bribe demands has no impact on the
log of temporary labour used. This makes it difficult to draw any real conclusions about the
employment of temporary workers of the share or temporary workers in overall employment.
As noted in the previous section, our OLS estimates are likely to suffer from endogeneity
and we will not be able to interpret the coefficients as showing us a causal relationship be-
tween the dependant variables and bribe frequency. Therefore we use an identification strategy
that follows that of Fisman and Svensson (2007). The instrument we shall be using for bribe
frequency is the region-industry average of bribe frequency. As the instrument is an average
based of the bribe experiences of an industry-region’s firms, it should not be influenced by the
characteristics of individual firms. It should also be unrelated to reporting error as this should
idiosyncratic to the firm or the staff member completing the survey.
In tables 1.4 - 1.6 we present coefficients obtained when estimating this relationship using the
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Table 1.3: OLS, Y: Log Temporary Workers
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Bribe Frequency 0.00152 0.00167 0.00296 0.000157
(0.00364) (0.00367) (0.00336) (0.00314)
Court Quality 0.0361 0.0381 0.0301
(0.0703) (0.0687) (0.0786)




Buenos Aires 0.597 0.591 0.264 0.0418
(0.379) (0.378) (0.405) (0.401)
Rosario -0.168 -0.182 -0.206 -0.339
(0.432) (0.431) (0.446) (0.479)
Mendoza 0.648 0.642 0.592 0.547
(0.433) (0.433) (0.447) (0.467)
Cordoba 0.553 0.554 0.548 0.399
(0.482) (0.482) (0.495) (0.621)
Constant 2.028∗∗∗ 1.965∗∗∗ 1.900∗∗∗ 2.139∗∗∗
(0.360) (0.374) (0.395) (0.405)
Observations 358 358 357 297
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.4: 2SLS First Stages
(1) (2) (3)
LogInv LogLab LogTemp
Average Bribe Freq 9.935∗∗∗ 9.39∗∗∗ 6.8∗∗
( 2) (1.765) (3.01)
Court Quality -1.77∗∗ 1.6∗∗ -2.44∗
(0.9) (0.7) (1.3)
Foreign Ownership -0.02 -0.04 -0.04
(0.029) (0.04) (0.001)
Previous Sales 4.03e-10 2.02e-10 4.05e-10
(1.42e-09) ( 1.46e-09 ) (1.50e-09)
Constant -8.74 -6.9 -6.93
(6.15) (5.2) (8.73)
F-Statistic 24.58 28.33 5.02
Observations 420 597 257
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
industry-region level of bribe frequency in a Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS) model. The first
stage uses the instrument to generate predicted values of bribe frequency. These predicted val-
ues are then used in the second stage to obtain exogenous estimates of the relationship between
bribe frequency and the dependant variables. We require two conditions to hold in order for
2SLS to give us causal estimates of the relationships in question. Firstly our instrument must
be strong, meaning it must be strongly and significantly related to the endogenous regressor
of interest, namely bribe frequency. We can be sure that the instrument is strong if the first
stage F-statistic is above 10. Whilst the exclusion restriction cannot be tested, we argued in
section 1.5 that measurement errors should be idiosyncratic in nature and without an regional
or industrial pattern.
The first stage regression results are shown in table 1.4. In column 1 of table 1.4 we can see that
our instrument is strongly and positively correlated with bribe frequency when running the log
investment model. We also have a first stage F-statistic of 24.58, showing that the instrument is
indeed a strong one. However, the sample size of different in each of the 2SLS models. While we
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Table 1.5: 2SLS, Y: Log Investment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Bribe Frequency -0.0376∗∗ -0.0407∗∗ -0.0228 -0.0286
(0.0174) (0.0184) (0.0164) (0.0174)
Buenos Aires 1.042∗∗ 1.089∗∗ 0.533 0.310
(0.441) (0.445) (0.393) (0.450)
Rosario 0.0635 0.181 0.00515 -0.112
(0.548) (0.557) (0.487) (0.565)
Mendoza 0.462 0.484 0.249 0.282
(0.553) (0.557) (0.490) (0.581)
Cordoba 0.497 0.468 0.389 0.465
(0.565) (0.570) (0.497) (0.563)
Court Quality -0.161∗ -0.108 -0.125
(0.0939) (0.0829) (0.0863)




Constant 12.99∗∗∗ 13.28∗∗∗ 13.04∗∗∗ 13.34∗∗∗
(0.451) (0.507) (0.446) (0.462)
First Stage F 33.76 31.18 29.71 24.58
Observations 492 492 491 420
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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obtain adequate first stage F-statistics for the models looking at log investment and permanent
labour, the temporary labour model has an F-statistic below 10 and hence the instrument is
not strong in this case.
Table 1.5 shows the results obtained when using a Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS) specifica-
tion with the aforementioned instrument. As in the case of the OLS regressions the foreign
ownership and previous period sales variables have highly significant and positive effects on the
log of investment. In contrast to the OLS regressions however, we can see that the frequency
of bribe demands has a significant and negative impact on the log of investment. A few notes
are worth making. Firstly, we have a very small coefficient on bribe frequency. Therefore even
if a firm were to go from never being asked to bribes to always being asked (i.e moving from a
bribe frequency of 0% to 100%), this would only reduce the log of investment by 2.9%. Thus
we would need a fairly dramatic change in bribe behaviour to induce a rather modest change.
Secondly, this result is only significant at the 10% significance level and is greatly dwarfed
by the effects of foreign ownership and firm size. Thus we may say that we have some weak
evidence for our theory that bribery increases the costs of running capital, hence more frequent
bribe demands cause firms to invest less in capital. In addition to this it will be interesting to
see if our labour input results as shown in tables 1.2 and 1.3 still apply when using a similar
identification strategy to that used in table 1.5.
In table 1.6 we see that our results are qualitatively rather similar to those obtained in the OLS
specification of the same model, with previous period sales being by far the strongest determi-
nant of full-time labour usage, foreign ownership being significant but weak and the frequency
of bribes having a negative and significant effect at the 5% level in the full specification. The
first stage regression for this model is also displayed in table 1.4. Looking at column 2 we can
see that again we have a strong instrument, with an F-statistic of 28.33. In principle the two
first stage regressions should be the same, however the sample sizes are different. This is the
most likely cause of the first stage results varying with the choice of dependent variable in the
second stage.
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Table 1.6: 2SLS, Y: Log Permanent Labour
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Bribe Frequency -0.0327∗∗∗ -0.0336∗∗∗ -0.0204∗ -0.0244∗∗
(0.0118) (0.0121) (0.0109) (0.0111)
Court Quality -0.0592 -0.0379 -0.0817
(0.0532) (0.0466) (0.0511)




Buenos Aires 1.244∗∗∗ 1.258∗∗∗ 0.918∗∗∗ 0.659∗∗
(0.254) (0.256) (0.226) (0.271)
Rosario 0.496 0.524 0.446 0.199
(0.323) (0.326) (0.283) (0.333)
Mendoza 0.116 0.129 0.0160 -0.148
(0.327) (0.329) (0.287) (0.337)
Cordoba 0.543∗ 0.536∗ 0.517∗ 0.455
(0.322) (0.324) (0.281) (0.334)
Constant 3.388∗∗∗ 3.496∗∗∗ 3.329∗∗∗ 3.757∗∗∗
(0.256) (0.284) (0.249) (0.274)
First Stage F 36.71 35.11 32.9 28.33
Observations 725 725 724 597
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.7: 2SLS, Y: Log Temporary Labour
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Bribe Frequency -0.0373 -0.0371 -0.0284 -0.0378
(0.0359) (0.0355) (0.0335) (0.0328)
Court Quality -0.0172 -0.00301 -0.0504
(0.106) (0.100) (0.125)




Buenos Aires 0.613 0.619 0.263 0.0896
(0.576) (0.587) (0.562) (0.722)
Rosario -0.255 -0.247 -0.311 -0.478
(0.649) (0.650) (0.596) (0.723)
Mendoza 0.756 0.766 0.663 0.644
(0.619) (0.634) (0.597) (0.727)
Cordoba 0.243 0.244 0.248 0.273
(0.611) (0.611) (0.560) (0.768)
Constant 2.377∗∗∗ 2.402∗∗∗ 2.289∗∗∗ 2.653∗∗∗
(0.476) (0.510) (0.473) (0.563)
First Stage F 5.06 5.17 4.87 5.02
Observations 301 301 300 257
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
As with the previous regression, the results shown in table 1.7 largely reflect those obtained
using an OLS specification. We can see that the frequency of bribes does not affect the amount
of temporary labour used. This fits with the hypothesis that whilst reducing their investment
in capital, firms facing a high chance of paying bribes will also try to make their labour usage
more flexible. However, in this case we are not able to accurately identify the relationship
using our identification strategy. Looking at column 3 of table 1.4 we can see that although
our instrument is significantly related to the frequency of bribes at the 5% level, our first stage
F-statistic is only 5.02, showing that the instrument is weak.
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In conclusion we find that the frequency with which bribes are demanded from firms has a
negative effect on investment, as predicted in our model. However the effect is not particu-
larly strong. These costs are likely to reflect the additional cost to operating capital that is
represented by bribe payment for licenses and permits. However it is also possible that our
results may show weak effects as some firms may be using bribe payments to obtain licenses
and permits that they would not be eligible for if applying legitimately. A final note should be
made that sadly the amount of the data has limited the research possibilities to a considerable
extent. Not only were we short of choices when trying to find suitable instruments for our 2SLS
regressions, but the limited time dimension made it very hard to track the behaviour of firms
over time.
1.7 Conclusion
This chapter aimed to examine the dynamics of firms’ input choices when faced with public
bodies that create uncertainty with their demands for bribes. In this paper we have looked at
how the frequency of demands for bribes affects the choice of inputs used by firms.
We argue that when firms have to secure permits and licences by corrupt means, they face
a deal of uncertainty as they have no means of recourse if the corrupt arrangement is reneged
on, or if further bribes are demanded for the same purpose. As capital adjustment incurs costs,
the firm will aim to reduce capital holdings when it faces uncertainty arising from bribe de-
mands.
We find weak evidence to show that firms will opt for more flexible inputs when faced with un-
certainty, reducing both investment and the number of full-time employees. However the use of
workers on short-term contracts is unaffected, suggesting that where possible firms will aim to
use more flexible inputs. We have argued that this fits with the implications of the theoretical
model and demonstrate firms using more flexible inputs that allow them to minimise capital
adjustment costs.
1.7. Conclusion 35
The findings in this paper suggest that lower corruption - and thus lower uncertainty - will en-
able firms to invest more. This fits with conclusions drawn elsewhere in the literature (O’Toole
and Tarp, 2012; Gamberoni et al, 2016). Our findings also suggest that policy measures to
reduce corruption can also encourage firms to create more permanent jobs and rely less on
temporary labour. It is possible that this could improve the stability and remuneration from
employment, if the certainty afforded by lower corruption allows firms to invest in the skills of
their workforce and create pay incentives to retain talented staff.
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Appendix B- Summary Statistics
Table 1.8: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. N
Log Investment 12.683 2.167 1275
Log Lab 3.706 1.548 2106
Log Temp 2.36 1.565 843
Court Quality 2.33 1.346 2117
Foreign 11.624 30.87 2113
Previous Sales 71777341.169 479131613.639 1602
Bribe Frequency 6.988 21.662 1683
Appendix C- OLS regressions, non-robust Standard Errors (Tables
1.9 - 1.11
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Table 1.9: Y: Log Investment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Bribe Frequency -0.00540 -0.00579 -0.00390 -0.00609
(0.00430) (0.00429) (0.00407) (0.00418)
Court Quality -0.0509 -0.0408 -0.0427
(0.0685) (0.0629) (0.0699)




Buenos Aires 1.243∗∗∗ 1.248∗∗∗ 0.709∗∗ 0.441
(0.304) (0.302) (0.299) (0.271)
Rosario 0.439 0.468 0.351 0.0842
(0.378) (0.379) (0.370) (0.394)
Mendoza 0.611 0.606 0.454 0.298
(0.376) (0.375) (0.372) (0.380)
Cordoba 0.870∗∗ 0.860∗∗ 0.729∗∗ 0.702∗∗
(0.357) (0.354) (0.352) (0.355)
Constant 12.50∗∗∗ 12.60∗∗∗ 12.57∗∗∗ 12.82∗∗∗
(0.279) (0.295) (0.289) (0.262)
Observations 567 567 566 479
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.10: Y: Log of Permanent Labour
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Bribe Frequency -0.00410∗∗ -0.00401∗∗ -0.00231 -0.00338∗
(0.00202) (0.00203) (0.00186) (0.00192)
Court Quality 0.0171 0.0149 -0.0129
(0.0374) (0.0351) (0.0387)




Buenos Aires 1.292∗∗∗ 1.291∗∗∗ 0.964∗∗∗ 0.685∗∗∗
(0.178) (0.178) (0.184) (0.205)
Rosario 0.735∗∗∗ 0.729∗∗∗ 0.680∗∗∗ 0.359
(0.213) (0.213) (0.214) (0.247)
Mendoza 0.297 0.297 0.233 0.0693
(0.208) (0.208) (0.208) (0.242)
Cordoba 0.851∗∗∗ 0.853∗∗∗ 0.792∗∗∗ 0.620∗∗
(0.220) (0.220) (0.222) (0.256)
Constant 3.080∗∗∗ 3.048∗∗∗ 3.015∗∗∗ 3.374∗∗∗
(0.163) (0.178) (0.182) (0.204)
Observations 867 867 866 700
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.11: Y: Log of Temporary Labour
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Bribe Frequency 0.00152 0.00167 0.00296 0.000157
(0.00405) (0.00407) (0.00391) (0.00409)
Court Quality 0.0361 0.0381 0.0301
(0.0718) (0.0691) (0.0778)




Buenos Aires 0.597 0.591 0.264 0.0418
(0.376) (0.377) (0.365) (0.432)
Rosario -0.168 -0.182 -0.206 -0.339
(0.447) (0.448) (0.430) (0.506)
Mendoza 0.648 0.642 0.592 0.547
(0.431) (0.432) (0.416) (0.485)
Cordoba 0.553 0.554 0.548 0.399
(0.445) (0.446) (0.427) (0.534)
Constant 2.028∗∗∗ 1.965∗∗∗ 1.900∗∗∗ 2.139∗∗∗
(0.359) (0.380) (0.365) (0.432)
Observations 358 358 357 297
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Chapter 2
Employment and Support for Populists
in an Illiberal State: Evidence from
Hungary
Abstract
The recent rise of populist parties across the western world has become a defining feature of
modern politics. However, research into the forces driving this phenomenon focuses n western
democracies, populist parties have always been in opposition. This potentially conflates the
effects of populist rhetoric and evaluations of government. In this paper we aim to overcome
this using data from Hungary - where populists have been governing since 2010. This can help
shed light on whether voters are drawn to populist ideology of whether the recent success of
populists is a reaction to the economic shocks from the Great Recession. We find that higher
regional employment shares lead to lower support for the governing populist party, as well as
Hungary’s main liberal opposition party. This suggests that political calculations also factor in




Recent years have been characterised by a turbulent period in European politics. In this time
parties representing the liberal democratic consensus have suffered continual electoral losses,
often losing out to parties that espouse populist rhetoric and challenge ideas as fundamental
as pluralism, free markets and universal human rights (Muller, 2017.
These populist parties overwhelmingly promote right-wing ideologies and strongly oppose key
features of globalisation. In particular the nativist ideologies of these parties lead to vocal op-
position to immigration, foreign business and international governance. Far from Fukuyama’s
”end of history, the parties currently gaining traction in the western world are actively fo-
menting a rift in western democracies, centered around the legitimacy of the liberal-democratic
consensus based on pluralistic political institutions and global economic integration (Mudde
and Kaltwasser, 2017).
How do we account for the recent electoral success of populist parties? A major line of reasoning
is that the movement of voters away from mainstream parties can be attributed to economic
hardships, which are blamed on globalisation and the policies of political ”elites” (Inglehardt
and Norris, 2016). These economic difficulties causes voters to turn to alternative parties, who
offer to ensure real wage growth by fighting exploitative international rules and limiting com-
petition from foreign workers.
In this paper we take the case of Hungary to test the idea that adverse employment shocks
automatically lead to support for populist parties. Not only does Hungary only have an es-
tablished populist party currently in power, but it is rivaled by an equally radical opposition
populist party along side some liberal democratic parties. This allows us to distinguish between
the effect on support for populists from support for opposition parties
This setting allows us to test several ideas. Firstly, the recent literature has generally ex-
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trapolated from the western setting (see Algan et al, 2017) to conclude that economic hardship
will always cause voters to support populist parties. Our setting allows us to gain a deeper
understanding of the forces driving support for populist parties by examining a setting where a
populist party has been in power and presided over the country’s recovery from the 2008 global
financial crisis. This setting also offers some insight into the mechanic s behind the recent rise
of populism, as - unlike previous papers - we are able to distinguish between the effects of
employment levels on support for incumbent populists and an ideologically similar opposition
party. This allows us to distinguish between voters adopting populists ideals (see Inglehart and
Norris, 2016) and voting in protest at poor economic management (see Duch and Stevenson,
2008). As such, we can comment on whether the recent success of populists parties is driven
by a cultural shift towards to populist ideals or by economic factors.
To answer these questions we build several Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS) models using
data from the European Social Survey and Eurostat. In our 2SLS models we control for endo-
geneity by using a Bartik instrument to obtain estimates of exogenous shifts in labour demand.
Our results suggest that improvements in region level employment actually reduce support for
the incumbent populist party. We also find a negative relationship between employment and
support for the MSZP. We interpret this in terms of improved economic circumstances reducing
the risks associated with supporting younger parties without governing experience. This allows
voters to prioritise ideological concerns over economic ones. This results fits with De Vries
(2018), who finds that euroscepticism is higher in more developed European countries. The
rationale behind this is that better economic conditions allow citizens to hold more optimistic
ideas of the future outside of the European Union.
In section 2 we review the relevant literature and present the key arguments explaining the
rise of populism. Section 3 then presents the context of our study, offering an overview of the
Hungarian political parties and a brief political history of Hungary since the end of Commu-
nism. We present our regression model in section 4, before discussing our identification strategy.
Section 5 gives a description if the data used in this study. Lastly, in section 6 we present our
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results and discuss what their implications, before section 7 concludes.
2.2 Literature Review
Before discussing the literature, it is worth briefly establishing what is meant by the term
”populism”. Mudde and Kaltwasser (2017) describe populism as ’a thin-centred ideology that
considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic camps, ”the
pure people” versus the ”corrupt elite” and which argues that politics should be an expression
of the ”volonte generale” (general will) of the people,’. The core of this is the antagonism
between two rival camps, with the people seen as being a majority group in society and the
elite painted as a disproportionately powerful group exhibiting economic and cultural privilege.
This is highly significant as it is almost the mirror image of the view espoused by liberal
democracy, which highlights the differences between groups in society and the ability of indi-
viduals to belong to multiple groups and change identity. ’The people’ is a rather flexible term
that can refer to national or racial groups, but can also have a class dimension, reflecting a type
of common person who is excluded from the political system and from respectable culture. ’The
elite’ is commonly associated with privileged economic, cultural and media groups. Typically
the elite are considered to wield power illegitimately and are either uninterested in the people
or acting directly against them. This explains the tendency of populist groups to oppose most
mediating legal and political bodies, such as courts and representative parliaments, as these
are seen as impediments to the general will, which is best represented by the party or its leaders.
The ’thin centred’ aspect of this definition allows us to explain why populist parties may often
look quite different to each other. As populist ideology mainly focuses on the homogeneity
and sovereignty of those whom government represents, it is perfectly compatible with other
ideologies and is often an aspect of a ’host’ ideology. Hence populism does not inherently lend
itself to any other type of ideology and fits just as well with a socialist policy platform as with
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a nationalist or neo-liberal one (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2016).
Attempts to explain the recent surge in support for populists parties in the western world have
come to revolve around a distinction between economic arguments and cultural arguments. The
economic argument states that voters are drawn towards populist parties as a result of eco-
nomic hardship. This theory rests on the idea that when economic resources are scarce, voters
are prone to see themselves as part of a group that are in competition for resources with other
groups (Golder, 2016). Intergroup competition is a crucial element of populist rhetoric, and
thus we should expect that voters should move towards populist parties if economic conditions
lead their daily experiences to match the narratives being offered by their parties. Another way
in which economic deprivation can drive support for populist parties is by fueling dissatisfac-
tion with incumbent parties, especially if they are seen as responsible for managing the state
of the economy (Golder, 2016; Inglehart and Norris, 2016). Thus votes for populists can be a
statement against incumbents as much as a statement of support for populists.
Older studies in the field of political science have provided mixed evidence of the relationship
between unemployment and support for populist parties, with some finding no effect (Lubbers
and Sheepers, 2002), some finding a negative effect (Arzheimer and Carter, 2006; Knigge, 1998)
and some showing a positive effect (Golder, 2003). However, Golders’ findings come with the
important caveat that unemployment will only lead to greater support for nativist populist
groups if the level of immigration is high. Two features stand out with these papers. Firstly
they rely on estimation methods that do not have clear identification strategies and secondly
these papers cover periods before the global financial crisis of 2008. Even over relatively short
time frames, there is a lot of potential for fringe political movements to form, disband, merge
or rebrand. We can see this in the Hungarian case, where Jobbik went from being a junior
member of a small coalition to a large and independent opposition party in less than 10 years.
As a result, it is not clear how much older studies can tell us about the modern dynamics of
populist politics. Papers written since the global financial crisis have consistently found that
unemployment increases support for populist parties, both left-wing and right-wing (Algan,
2.2. Literature Review 51
2017; Guiso et al, 2017; Inglehart and Norris, 2016). These papers are informative as they
show a strong relationship across Europe that applies in both the advanced democracies of
Western Europe and the newer democracies of Eastern Europe.
A trend that is picked up on in these studies is the north-south divide within Europe, with left-
wing populists being prominent in the southern periphery countries and right-wing populists
in the central and northern regions. Rodrik (2017) argues that whilst the rise of populism is
tied to globalisation shocks, the type of populist parties that thrive depend on the types of
shocks felt most sharply. Specifically he argues that when the effects of globalisation are seen
in the form of high levels of immigration and influxes of refugees, it is easy for populists to
exploit national or ethnic divisions and cultural concerns. Likewise, when globalisation shocks
primarily affect income inequality through trade or investment flows, parties may construct a
narrative of conflict between social classes.
Some country-level studies help to confirm these trends. Dehdari (2017) shows that support for
the right-wing Sweden Democrats party in an electoral precinct is bolstered by higher numbers
of lay-off notifications (provisional declarations by firms of intent to reduce staff numbers).
Similarly in the case of Spain, Ramiro and Gomez (2017) find that voters facing economic inse-
curity in the form of unemployment or precarious employment were more likely to support the
far-left populists Podemos. These cases highlight the broad trend of unemployment increasing
support for populist parties and help to illustrate the north-south divide.
Algan et al (2017) make a valuable contribution to the literature by delving deeper into the
mechanisms through which changes in economic circumstances impact support for populist
parties. In EU countries, unemployment is shown to reduce trust in national and European
parliaments, whilst having little impact on attitudes towards migrants. As well as being a
mechanism through which unemployment affects support for populists, this finding also sug-
gests that support for populists may primarily be a reaction against incumbents rather than a
generalised ideological shift.
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Other literature shows a broader relationship between globalisation pressures and disturbances
to conventional political dynamics. In the USA, Autor et al (2016) show increased exposure to
imports from China lead to greater polarisation of congressional representatives. Areas initially
in Republican hands were shown to return more conservative candidates following an increase in
exposure to imports, whilst those initially held by the Democratic Party returned more liberal
candidates. Similarly, Voorheis et al (2015) find that political polarisation increases with in-
come disparities. Whilst they find Republican states become more conservative and Democrat
states become more liberal, the effect is stronger for republican states, resulting in an overall
rightward shift. This is consistent with some of the theoretical work on the topic (Feddersen
and Gul, 2015). In the case of the European Referendum in the UK, both actual unemployment
and feelings of economic marginalisation have been shown to have increased the vote to leave
the EU (Becker et al, 2016; Clarke et al, 2017). These studies highlight a general tendency for
economic distress to push voters away from the political mainstream.
Trends in globalisation are also important, as highlighted by Autor (2016) and Rodrik (2017).
The tendency of globalisation to result in increased migration and more flexible labour markets
can lead to native workers facing tougher competition for jobs, as well as lower wages (Dehdari,
2017). This is the basis of the modernisation losers hypothesis (Golder, 2016). Although there
is mixed evidence regarding the effect of immigration on local labour market conditions (see
Borjas and Monras, 2017; Bodvarson et al, 2008; Clemens and Hunt, 2017; Peri and Yasanev,
2017), it may be enough for native workers to believe that immigration is worsening local labour
market conditions to generate support for populists. Given that native low skilled workers are
more likely to be in competition with low-skilled migrant labour, whilst high-skilled immigrants
are more likely to be to complements to high-skilled natives, the modernisation losers hypothe-
sis may help to explain why it is predominantly older and less educated citizens who are drawn
to populist parties, especially right-wing nativist parties (Clark et at, 2017; DeVries, 2017;
Ramiro and Gomez, 2017).
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The second main explanation for the recent rise of populism characterises it as a backlash
against the ideological development of the last few decades. According to this view the relative
economic security of the post war period lead to ”post-materialst” values dominating western
politics (Inglehart, 1971). As basic economic needs were met with increasing certainty, voters
started to prioritise more abstract concerns such gender equality, human rights and environ-
mental protection thus giving rise to the various post-war progressive movements (Inglehgart
and Norris, 2016). This is supposed to have prompted a backlash as older and less educated
citizens are less able to cope with the erosion of traditional norms and social hierarchies that
primarily benefited them (Minkenberg, 2000; Rydgren andTyrberg, 2016). As a result, pop-
ulist groups who promised to undo the progressive trends of the previous decades were able to
draw support from this section of society (Minkenberg, 2000). This argument is supported by
DeVries (2017), who draws on data from the Netherlands to show that the traditional left-right
divide in Dutch politics is being replaced by a cultural divide between liberal and parochial
worldviews. As intuitive as the cultural explanation is, it does little to explain the short-run
time variation in the support of populist parties. Specifically, it does little to help us under-
stand why the current resurgence of populist parties is occurring now.
The two explanations do not have to be mutually exclusive, however. It is possible that eco-
nomic and cultural insecurity are related. Golder (2003) finds that unemployment has a great
effect on support for the far-right when migration is highest. Likewise the effect of migration
is negligible unless unemployment happens to be high. This suggests that in order for either
factor to affect political views there must be a convincing narrative that links economic and
cultural factors in such a way that nativist policies appear to offer convincing solutions. De
Vries and Hoffman (2016) highlight survey evidence from across Europe that voters do indeed
make this link, opposing immigration and supporting far-right parties as a way of safeguarding
their jobs and income from foreign competition.
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2.2.1 Mechanisms
What economic mechanisms might link employment shocks and other adverse events to politi-
cal preferences? In the previous literature we saw that inter-group competition can play a role
in fostering support for populist parties. Ee consider the possibility of economic circumstances
increasing the gains to be made by supporting a party that will represent them in intergroup
contests. Here we treat an election as a potential conflict between groups, in which each group
aims to increase its utility through voting in a party that will legislate in the group’s interests.
For our purposes we will assume that voters are playing a zero-sum game and that economic
gains can only be secured at the cost of the other group. This reflects the nativist and exclu-
sionary nature of populist rhetoric, in which the welfare of a native group is prioritised over
some outside group. We can see this in references to tougher migration policy, giving native
workers priority in hiring decisions and the portrayal of outside groups as taking from the native
group (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2017).
As such we see native citizens as having a choice; either to support a non-populist with no
aim of intervening in intergroup conflict or to support a populist party. As the populist parties
aim to reduce the welfare of the outside group, we can see the decision to support a populist
party as an attack on the group that the party proposes to exclude. However, supporting a
populist potentially incurs costs. These costs may stem from the inexperience that a populist
party has in governing or potentially for radical isolationist policies prolonging economic prob-
lems in the long run. The Fidesz party offers an example of such policies. Since coming to
power the party has imposed numerous price controls on utility companies in a bid to reduce
household energy bills, particularly in the run-up to elections. The result of this has been that
utility companies have either cut costs by reducing maintenance and imposing harsher working
conditions on workers or have simply left the market (Kiss, 2014; Reuters, 2014). These mea-
sures are likely to result in higher prices or lower quality of service provision in the long run as
operating costs increase and the market becomes less competitive.
Mitra and Ray (2014) develop a model to study the dynamics of intergroup violence. Be-
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low we adapt their idea of an ’attack function’ which explains when one group will attack
another. Let us imagine there are two distinct groups, a native group and an outside group.
Whether a native group will ’attack’ the outside group is determined by:
(1-ρ)[1-t]z + ρ([1-t]z + λy > z
Where ρ is the probability of an attack being successful, t represents the opportunity cost
of attacking the outside group, λ represents a share of the outside group’s income that can
be appropriated by a successful attack, whilst z and y denote native group and outside group
incomes respectively. This equation simply shows that the native group will attack the outside
group if the gains from attacking the other group are greater than native group income. In our
context this ’attack’ takes the form of supporting a party that will legislate against the outside
group’s interests. The gains denoted by λ do not need to be objective, they can be expected
gains. For example, a native group member may vote for a populist party not in order to obtain
a specific job for him or herself, but rather with the prospect of the native group as a whole
taking jobs previously held by the outside group. As we are dealing with a zero-sum setting,
we can consider λ to be a fixed share of outside-group income, y. As outside group income
increases, the potential gains from attacking also increase. From the above we can derive the
threshold income at which the native group will attack the outside group:
z < (λρ/t)y
From the above we can see that as native group income decreases, attacking becomes more
appealing. Meanwhile, as the opportunity cost of attacking increases the chances of the native
group attacking will fall. It is possible that native group income and risk are related however.
We assume that native group members are interested in the long-run health of the economy.
For example, if income falls below a certain point, it may be imperative to use savings to
keep consumption above a subsistence level. This will only be feasible for a certain amount
of time, meaning that long-term damage done by the policies of a populist government will
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affect native-group members adversely. As a result the effect of a fall in z will depend on the
perceived sizes of λ and t. That is, there will be counter-acting effects of income redistribution
and risk.
2.3 Setting
Hungary is a new democracy in Eastern Europe, with a parliamentary system in place since
the end of Communist rule in 1989. What makes Hungary of interest to our purposes here is
the success of populists since the Global Financial Crisis. The country currently has a populist
incumbent and the largest opposition party is also a populist one. This gives Hungary an
unusual dynamic, in which a vote for populists does not have to be a form of protest against
incumbents.
In this section I shall introduce the three main parties in Hungarian politics and the issues
defining current political debate. I shall then offer a brief history of Hungarian democracy
since the fall of the Communist regime in 1989. This will offer some context to the current
debates and help explain the changes undergone by each of the parties.
The history of democracy in Hungary has taken many more twists and turns than its short
duration may lead us to expect. When Communist rule came to an end in Hungary, many
of the current political groups operating today existed as dissident groups. The most promi-
nent of these was the Alliance of Young Democrats (Fiatal Demokratak Szovetsege) - known
as Fidesz, who rose to prominence through their anti-communist and anti-establishment youth
group (Palonen, 2009). Upon forming as a party they initially adopted a liberal democratic
stance, promoting values that looked very familiar in the West. However, despite their promi-
nence as an anti-communist movement, they secured a meager 9% in the 1990 election - the
first free election since 1945.
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Of the newly formed political parties, one was notable for not having started out as a dissident
movement during communism. Despite being a new political party, The Hungarian Socialist
Party (Magyar Szocialista Part, or MSZP) was the legal successor to the Communist regime
(DEmocratic Society, 2014). However the party no longer advocated the policies or institutions
of the Communist regime, running instead on a social democratic platform embracing market
economic and cooperation with the West. None the less, the party performed poorly in the
1990 elections, coming in fourth with just under 11% of the vote.
Following their electoral defeat Fidesz moved to fill the political space on the right, with party
leader Viktor Orban stating that the party would remain a ’kind of spare part’ if it continued
to operate on the centre left, but noting that on the right ’there are many small players and we
can be the co-ordinators of the divided right wing’ (Financial Times, 2018). Following this the
party adopted a more traditional centre right position, promoting the interests of the propertied
middle class and stressing the importance of religion and national identity. This was the start
of the path, along which the party has continued until now.
In the following election, the MSZP were able to win a parliamentary majority and form a
government. This marked the beginning of an effective two-party system that lasted until
2010, in which government alternated between MSZP and Fidesz led coalitions. This system
was clearly polarised along several lines. Firstly the parties fashioned themselves as being dis-
tinguished by a left - right divide. The terms did not follow the conventional western usage
however, the labels being used to distinguish between the liberal (left) and conservative (right)
parties. This was despite the liberal parties advocating neoliberal policies more frequently as-
sociated with centre right parties, and the conservatives being in favour of state intervention in
many sectors of the economy (Palonen, 2009). In their time in government the MSZP pushed
to reduce the size of the state, carried out several privatisation initiatives and aimed to limit
benefits to those on low incomes (Democratic Society, 2014).
Over the years the party became more vocal in its advocacy of traditional moral values, based
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on a pre-communist image of Hungarian life, with religion at the fore front (Fehervary, 2011;
Palonen, 2009). Since the party’s first period in government (1998 - 2002), the party has also
started to use populist rhetoric to justify policies and to characterise itself as the natural party
of the the people (Enyedi, 2016).
Since 2010 the government of Hungary has been formed by Fidesz, with Viktor Orban as
Prime Minister. The party now defines itself as a patriotic party that defends Christian Hun-
gary against mass immigration and the influence of international NGOs (Enyedi, 2016). What
this often means in practice is rhetoric that demonises ethnic minorities, international coopera-
tion and political dissent. Following this rhetorical line, Fidesz have erected statues of far-right
wartime leaders as well as monuments whitewashing Hungary’s fascist history, given the State
more scope to control the actions of the Roma community and imposed arbitrary taxes on lib-
eral NGOs (Enyedi, 2016, Spiegel, 2013). This has culminated in attempts to close the Central
European University (CEU) by means of imposing unrealistic bureaucratic regulations, as well
as a Stop Soros bill which aims to make it illegal for Human Rights NGOs to assist prospec-
tive asylum seekers (Reuters, 2018). The name of the bill comes from the Hungarian-born
entrepreneur George Soros, who has been presented as a master conspirator plotting to under-
mine Europe through the work of the liberal organisations he supports. Fidesz demonstrate
many of the traits of a typical populist party in their rhetoric. Fidesz make a clear distinction
between the good citizens they represent and those who are to be excluded from political debate
(Muller, 2017). This manifests as a distinction between the ideas of a Christian Hungarian who
behaves in a socially conscious manner and any variety of foreign or excessively profane actor.
The single largest opposition party currently in the Hungarian Parliament is the Movement
for a Better Hungary (Jobbik Magyaroszagert Mozgalom), commonly known as Jobbik. Simi-
larly to Fidesz, Jobbik are a far-right populist party. They define the people in similar terms to
Fidesz, claiming to represent the Christian values of a pre-communist Hungary. Whilst critical
of international organisations such as the European Union, Jobbik are less aggressive in their
opposition and are open to reforms of certain EU policies and relations with outside organisa-
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tions. However, Jobbik go to greater lengths to stress the threats to ’the people’ from Hungary’s
minority Roma population (Karacsony and Rona,2011). Jobbik evoke historical greatness and
betrayal in their rhetoric (Enyedi, 2016). Jobbik rhetoric contains many references to ’Greater
Hungary’ (the territory held by the Kingdom of Hungary at the height of its power) and the
Treaty of Triannon in 1920, which saw the Kingdom of Hungary lose 72% of its land-area and
64% of its population. By referring to Greater Hungary, Jobbik are seen as aiming to create
a sense of nostalgia around a past golden age, which it aims to restore as well as persecuting
those accused undermining the nation’s previous status.
Jobbik has been very influential in opposition. Since coming to power in 2010, Fidesz have
adopted several policies originally advocated by Jobbik, such as introducing references to God
and the Holy Crown into the constitution, including the work of far-right writers into the na-
tional curriculum and extending Hungarian citizenship to Hungarian in the formerly Hungarian
held territories of neighbouring countries (Enyedi, 2016). This fits with a broad trend in East-
ern European countries of far-right parties being ineffective as electoral forces, but being able
to influence the agenda of mainstream parties in their favour (Mudde, 2005). However, in the
2018 election the party failed to make the electoral gains that it hoped for, while internal divi-
sions over the future direction of the party have reduced its prominence in recent policy debates.
What Fidesz and Jobbik have in common is a vision of society consisting of two parts, with
a ethnically and morally homogeneous people being undermined by foreign people and values.
Both parties have a majoritarian view of democracy. By this I mean that both parties see the
role of the State as being solely to protect the integrity of the majority group. As such their
polices and rhetoric are illiberal, with universal Human Rights and protections of minority
ways of life being dismissed as being part of the Western attempt to undermine the Hungarian
nation (Freedom House, 2018).
Today the MSZP are the third largest political party and have formed the largest part of
various left-liberal coalitions in previous elections. The party has been internally divided since
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the 2010 election and formers leaders Ferenc Gyurcsany and Gordon Bajnai have split from the
party to form the DK and Together parties respectively. The MSZP still maintains a policy
platform of advocating economic and social liberalism, supporting Hungary’s membership of
the European Union and protecting minority rights. However, the MSZP has taken to focusing
its rhetoric heavily on opposing Fidesz.
2.3.1 Previous work on Hungary
What factors have shaped the electoral fortunes of these parties? Krsnyi (1999) identified three
main cleavages in the start of the post-communist period. These highlighted the distinction
between secular and religious values, political classes and urban / rural voters. Looking at these
dimensions, the liberal and socialist parties such as the MSZP tend to have urban bases, with
less religious supporters who identify with the political left. On the other hand, conservative
voters are more prevalent in rural areas and are typically more religious. Knutsen (2013) finds
that these cleavages were still relevant in 2009, although Knutsen also raises the role of class
and education, with support for conservatives being stronger among less educated working-class
voters and support for liberals being higher among the service class. Similarly, Enyedi (2015)
identifies anti-communism, nationalism and religion as the key issues in Hungarian politics,
with conservative parties taking a strong line on each of these and parties such as the MSZP
taking more moderate views. These issues became the basis of party identities due to the
consensus surrounding the broad economic route that Hungary needed to take after the end of
communism, i.e moving to a capitalist system.
However, it is worth noting that these distinctions are not mutually exclusive and that parties
typically appeal to broad coalitions of voters. This may help explain Palonen’s (2009) asser-
tion that the conservatives typically appealed to an educated middle-class. Similarly Fehervary
(2011) provides a detailed account of class in post-communist Hungary, in which she stresses the
support for Fidesz among the professional middle class. Although this class may not support
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the statist economic policies of Fidesz, they often support the nationalist and anti-communist
aspects of Fidesz rhetoric- this group having once been the class enemies of the Communist
regime.
Karacsony and Rona (2011) look at the reasons for the growth of the Jobbik party. They
find the growth in support for Jobbik from 2006 to 2010 to be largely determined by me-
dia reports of clashes between Hungarian and Roma communities. This highlights two things.
Firstly it highlights the salience of tension between native majority and native minority groups,
whereas Western European populists focus almost exclusively on tension between natives and
immigrant communities (Kitschelt and Bustikova, 2009). It also shows the potential for the
political support to be driven in part by exogenous events and the dissemination of ideas.
Although previous points have stressed the role of broad political factors shaping the iden-
tities of the parties and their followers, empirical work still shows that economic conditions
play a key role in shaping the success or otherwise of political parties in Hungary. Lippenyi et
al (2013) look at public opinion data from 1998 to 2008 and find that incumbent parties are
generally rewarded for good economic performance with higher popularity. This supports the
economic voting hypothesis of Duch and Stevenson (2008). They also found that the relation-
ship between economic performance and voting intention became stronger over time, suggesting
that Hungary is still developing as a democracy and that political relationships may not hold for
long. However, there educational heterogeneities, with less educated citizens being less likely
to evaluate the incumbent party in terms of economic performance. Stegmaier and Lewis-Beck
(2011) conduct a similar analysis, looking specifically at support for the MSZP between 2002
and 2009 during which time they were the incumbent party. Support for the MSZP is found to
be strongly related to economic events, for example the IMF bailout in 2006 increased support
for the party whilst the level of unemployment was negatively related to support for the MSZP.
It is worth noting that with the Global Financial Crisis unemployment had reached 11.8% by
the time of the 2010 election, at which the party’s share of seats in parliament fell to 15% from
48% in 2006.
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This work highlights how cultural, political and economic factors all play an important part
in determining political identities in Hungary and the success of political parties. We can also
see that Hungary has evolved as a democracy since the first election in 1990, with economic
performance playing an increasingly important. However it is worth noting that our study
focuses on a period following the Global Financial Crisis. This was a monumental global shock
that has had profound effects on established democracies. As a result it is reasonable to expect
the Great Recession to have impacted the political dynamics of a developing democracy such
as Hungary. Due to this, the literature discussed here will be used to inform our hypotheses
and to help select control variables, although it should be noted that these are guides and our
results may reflect changing political dynamics.
2.4 Empirical Strategy
The aim of this study is to estimate the effect of employment on support for populist political
parties in Hungary. We also consider the effect on the largest liberal party in Hungary as they
are the largest party presenting a rival ideology to the populist incumbents. Below is the basic
OLS specification that we use to estimate this effect:
%Partyjrt = β0 + β1%Employmentrt + β2GDPrt + β3%Religiousrt + β4Immigrationrt
+β5Secondaryrt + β6Tertiaryrt + β7EUfundsrt + β8λt + β9ψr + ert
(2.1)
In the model above Party is the percentage share of respondents who claimed to feel closest to
party j in each region and time period. This is something of a short-hand as we also consider
the effect of employment on support for populists overall. The model above is estimated sep-
arately for each of the parties under consideration, with Party j referring to one party in each
regression. Employment gives the share of employed people in region r and time t. GDP gives
2.4. Empirical Strategy 63
the level of per capita income for each region in millions of 2015 Euros. Religious shows the
share of respondents who claimed to be strongly religious (rating themselves as 8 or above on
an 11 point scale). Immigration shows the level of net migration into each region as a share
of the region’s native population. It is worth noting that this specifically refers to migration
from abroad. Secondary and Tertiary refer to the shares of respondents who have secondary or
tertiary education as their highest level of education. EU funds gives the log of the amount of
money spent by the EU in each region under the Cohesion and Regional Development funds.
Here λ is a set of time dummies and ψ is a set of region dummies. e is the error term. Note
that variables vary at the level of regions and wave of the survey. Alongside the time and region
dummies, the main exception to this is the measure of EU funds. Due to the programming
periods running from 2007-2013 and 2013-2019, there is no variation across the first two waves
of the survey. Whilst variables are introduced gradually into the regressions presented in the
results tables, the time and region dummies are included in all regressions but in the interests
of clarity are not presented.
The choice of control variables reflects the factors most likely to affect the estimates of employ-
ment’s effect on populist sympathies. In controlling for the log of region GDP we aim to control
for the general economic climate in the region. We anticipate this will also help to control for
the quality of public services as well. Clarke et al (2017) demonstrate that concerns over public
services played a significant role in shaping public disaffection with mainstream politics in the
run up to the EU referendum in the UK. Public services are arguably the main way in which
the state affects citizens lives and so their effectiveness is likely to play a strong role in citizens
evaluations of the government. The log of population should reflect the degree of urbanisation
in the region, which we expect will reflect the diversity of employment opportunities (Dehdari,
2017).
The other variables aim to capture some of the other factors that may determine support for
far-right populist parties. As the populist parties are vocally eurosceptic and anti-immigration,
we have included both the log of funds received from the EU and immigrants entering the
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region as a share of the region’s population. We have included these on the premise that they
should affect voters attitudes towards Europe and immigration, with larger receipts from the
EU encouraging more pro-EU sentiments and a larger number of immigrants giving credibility
to populists prioritising of border control issues.
The degree of religious sentiment in a region is significant as religion is one of the main social
cleavages in Hungarian society (Knutsen, 2013). Fidesz and Jobbik have also made Hungary’s
’Christian heritage’ a central part of their rhetoric and have made frequent efforts to win the
support of the Christian denominations in Hungary (Enyedi, 2016). Hence here we have con-
structed a measure of strong religious sentiment, defined by a respondent giving a value of 8 or
more on a scale of religiosity, where 10 is strongly devout.
Lastly, we have included two measures of educational attainment. Here we take the share
of people giving primary, secondary and tertiary education as their highest level of of edu-
cation. These follow from the common finding that educational background plays a role in
shaping support for populists (Guiso et al, 2017; Inglehart and Norris, 2016). In the context
of Hungary, we expect that more educated citizens are less likely to support Fidesz or Jobbik
(Knutsen, 2013).
2.4.1 Identification Strategy
Unfortunately, our OLS regression will not give us estimates of a causal relationship between
employment and support for populists. One problem with the OLS model is that employ-
ment data is often noisy and struggles to properly incorporate part-time work and activities
in the shadow economy. Another potential problem is that there may be some reverse causal-
ity between employment and support for political parties. This may occur if parties allocate
resources to regional strongholds. This may occur if a party is responsible for the national or
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local allocation of state funds, for example through awarding of contract or commissioning of
projects. This issue is relevant to Hungary, where the governing party Fidesz is reputed for
allocating state resources as a means of consolidating support (Kiss, 2014).The OLS model also
fails to account for omitted time-variant regional factors that could drive the correlation or
lack thereof. As we saw in the previous section, some time varying regional factors may bias
estimates of the relationship between employment and support for populists. We already saw
the example how relationships between local Hungarian and Roma communities can influence
support for Jobbik in particular. Local party organisation may be another such factor.
To resolve the problem of endogeneity, we use a Bartik (or ’shift-share’) instrument to ob-
tain exogenous estimates of labour demand.The Bartik instrument is simple in principle, as it
combines changes at the aggregate level with lagged geographic distributions.
The Bartik instrument (also known as the shift-share instrument) has found a wide range
of applications in economics, with Jaeger et al (2018) citing over 60 instances of its use. While
being common in studies on trade and immigration, it has also found use in studies covering
fields as diverse as crime, fertility, residential segregation and health outcomes. This diverse
range of applications highlights the simple and versatile nature of the Bartik instrument.
How do we construct the Bartik instrument? In general the Bartik instrument weights local
economic compositions with aggregate level shifts to give predictions of exogenous variation.
Here we aim to estimate exogenous changes in labour demand. To do this we take use industry
shares in each of our regions and the national level changes in employment for each industry.
We have data on 10 industries (see appendix B for a list). For each region and time period we
calculate employment in each industry as a share of total employment. This is the part of the
instrument from which we obtain exogeneity. Each industry share is then multiplied by the
growth rate of employment at the national level between the current and previous periods. The
national level growth rate effectively acts as a weight applied to the shares, which ensures that
industries with higher growth rates play a greater role in determining the final Bartik value. In
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doing this, the national level growth rates serve the purpose of making the instrument relevant,
whilst the exogeneity of the instrument comes from the industry shares. The products of the
industry shares and growth rates are then summed for each region-time period, giving the final









gives the share of employment in region r that is associated with industry i- know
as the industry shares. These employment shares gives us the sectoral composition of employ-
ment in each region. Uit gives the national level of growth in employment for industry i between
period t and period t-1.
For each region, the Bartik instrument predicts changes in employment due to national-level
changes in labour demand. The intuition behind this instrument is that the industry shares are
the only part of the instrument to vary at the region level, thus it relies on exogeneity of the the
local industry composition -and thus the industry shares- for identification (Goldsmith-Pinkham
et al, 2018). The growth rates are used for instrument relevance, rather than identification.
We can see the instrument as reflecting the growth of regional labour market demand due to
changes in the national rates of industry growth (Bartik, 1991). Differences in sectoral compo-
sition mean that regions vary in the extent and manner in which they are affected by national
level shocks. As a result we can obtain exogenous variation in labour demand. Whilst the
exogeneity comes from the industry composition of our regions, this is not enough to give us
good estimates of labour demand shocks. See Van Dijk (2018) for a demonstration of this.
A potential issue with the Bartik instrument concerns the exogeneity of the industry shares.
It can be argued that it is hard to justify the exogeneity of the instrument as it is a weighted
average of many shifts. However it is not unreasonable for the sectoral composition of the
economy in each region be determined by exogenous geographic and historical features. These
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may relate to how rural or urban an area is and the presence of natural resources.
We can use this instrument to obtain 2SLS estimates of employment’s impact on political
support. When using 2SLS we have the following first stage equation:
Employmentrt = β0 + β1Bartikrt + β2GDPrt + β3Religiousrt + β4Immigrationrt
+β5Secondaryrt + β6Tertiaryrt + β7EUfundsrt + β8λt + β9ψr + ert
(2.3)
The predicted values from this regression give estimated values of shocks to labour demand in
each region and time-period. In the second stage the level of support for each political part
is regressed against these predicted values. By using the exogenous estimates obtained in the
first stage, we are able to overcome the issues associated with violations to the assumptions of
OLS and interpret our coefficients as showing a causal relationship.
In order for our instrument to be valid we require two conditions to hold. Firstly, there needs to
be a strong relationship between the Bartik instrument and employment. We find that whether
this condition holds depends on the exclusion of time and region dummies. Looking at table
2.13 in appendix C, we can see that this condition does indeed hold when these are excluded.
There is a significant relationship between the Bartik instrument and employment share in our
sample at the 1% level. The first stage F-statistic is 18.45, showing that the instrument is
strong in this case. However, the F-statistic is below 10 when including the dummies.
Another potential concern with using the Bartik instrument is that it may related to local
labour demand shocks. When regions are exposed to shocks, labour markets will adjust to a
new equilibrium. If this process is prolonged then the second stage error term may contain
factors relating to this adjustment process (Jaeger et al, 2018). One way of avoiding this is
to use the lagged industry composition with contemporary national-level growth. We run our
2sls models with an instrument constructed in this way as a robustness check. Results can be
found in appendix E. We find no significant difference, suggesting that this adjustment process
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is not a problem in our case.
2.5 Data
For our analysis the main source of data will be the European Social Survey (ESS). This survey
is conducted across 20 EU countries and several near-eastern countries. Respondents are asked
about a range of socio-demographic issues including values, social attitudes, political beliefs
and general lifestyle, offering a deep insight into who the respondents are, what they believe
and what their motivations are. Crucially, the ESS asks about political affiliation, thus allowing
us to track the level of support for each of the parties being considered here.
Data is available for Hungary for all waves of the survey, but unfortunately we are only able to
work with waves five, six and seven of the survey as the other waves do not contain information
on the region in which the respondent is based, a detail that is pivotal for our identification
strategy. In these three waves data is available for 20 NUTS3 regions. Each wave has around
1600-1700 respondents, with a total of 5275 respondents across the three waves of the survey.
We rely on the ESS for information on the level of support for each party. Two questions
are of relevance here: firstly respondents are asked if they support one party more than any
others; if they say yes then they are asked which party it is that they support. Whilst it would
have been preferable to use the questions on actual voting behaviour, this would have given
less variation in the data as there are at least two waves of the ESS conducted within each
electoral cycle. Furthermore, economic circumstances can influence the decision of whether or
not to vote at all (Guiso et al, 2017), thus looking at expressed attitudes prevents our results
being affected by selection bias.
Other variables that we take from the ESS relate to religiosity and education. For data on
employment status we rely on the questions that directly asked about the respondents em-
ployment status. For data on the strength of religious conviction- from which we can infer
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membership of a religious community- respondents are asked how devout they are. We create
a dummy variable which is equal to 1 if a respondent rates themselves as 8 or above on an
11 point scale, where 0 shows no faith and 10 shows very high religiosity. Respondents are
also asked what their highest level of educational attainment is. Answers are coded in the ESS
using UNESCO’s International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED) codes. From this
data we construct dummy variables for primary, secondary and tertiary as the highest level of
education (all respondents have completed some formal education). All the variables mentioned
thus far are aggregated to shares at the regional level. For the full text of the questions as they
appear in the survey, please see Appendix A.
Further to these, data on an additional four variables were taken from Eurostat. The first
of these is or independent variable of interest, namely employment. For each NUTS3 regions
we were able to obtain data on the total number of people employed. We then divided this by
the population to get employment as a share. Whilst it may have been more informative to
use unemployment data, the difficulty of associating unemployment with a particular industry
(as required by the Bartik instrument) was a major limitation to this. If we had used the
ESS data on unemployment, then we would be relying on unemployed respondents to associate
themselves with an industry. This would have been a matter of identity and would not have
been a reliable basis on which to construct our instrument.
The second Eurostat variable gives data on net migration for each NUTS3 region. This measures
net migration as the level of inward immigration per 1000 native inhabitants minus outward
migration. Eurostats glossary of terms makes clear that this refers to international migration,
thus we can rule out the possibility of the data reflecting internal movement of people within
Hungary. High immigration into an area may influence vote choice by increasing the visibility
of new cultural practices and increasing competition for jobs, hence making immigration a more
salient political issue.
The third variable from Eurostat is GDP per capita in Euros. Inflation was reasonably high
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in this period, averaging around 6% until 2013 when it steadily made its way down to 2%.
Consequently, values have been deflated to give real values in 2015 euros. The fourth variable
is population density for each NUTS3 region. This is given by the population divided by land
area of the region - excluding any inland waters. This variable should serve as a proxy for the
degree of urbanisation in each NUTS3 region.
As well as these we also have data on funds spent in each NUTS3 region under the European
Union’s Cohesion Fund and the European Regional Development Fund. This data was taken
from the European Commission’s data portal. The funds cover two programming periods. The
first of these is the 2007-2013 programming period and the second is the 2014-2020 program-
ming period. This gives the amount spent in each NUTS3 region under each programme. For
the 2014-2020 programming period I only took data on expenditures actually made rather than
funds allocated but not spent. Due to the period covered in this study covering the 2010-2014
period this means that there are only 2 values for each NUTS3 region.
2.5.1 Data Description
Here we aim to give an overview of some key features of the data. In figure 1 we can see the
distribution of the variables measuring support for each of the three parties and employment
share. The distribution of support for Fidesz and employment share is approximately normal.
However the distribution of support for Jobbik is skewed and support for the MSZP is closer
to a bimodal distribution. This may present issue with estimation. To deal with this we have
applied a Johnson transformation to the data. The distribution of the transformed variable is
shown in figure 2. Running a Shapiro-Wilk test for normality gives a p-value of 0.054, suggesting
that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the data are normally distributed.
Figures 3 and 4 show the spatial distribution of support for populist parties and the MSZP
(Hungary’s largest liberal party) within Hungary. In these figures we can see a map of Hungary
with the county / NUTS3 boundaries shown. The regions are coloured according to the value
























































Figure 2.2: Distribution of Transformed MSZP data



























Figure 2.4: Map of MSZP support
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parties or employment share. Looking at figure 3 can see the spatial distribution of support
for populist parties. Generally there is something of an east/west divide within Hungary. The
north-east of the country shows particularly high levels of support for populist parties. This
area has been particularly affected by conflict between Roma and Hungarian communities in
the last few years. As we have seen, this conflict between communities has played a large role in
mobilising nativist groups. On the other hand, the western side of Hungary shows much lower
support for populist parties. Figure 4 shows the distribution of support for the MSZP.We can
see that support for the MSZP is concentrated in the western part of Hungary. There are also
particularly strong concentrations in Budapest (the small black region in the center-north) and
in the south. Notice however that the axes in the two figures are different and so the colours
reflect the concentration rather than the level of support.
To get an initial idea of the relationships between employment and support for the parties
studied here, we present smoothing curves in figure 5. These are obtained by using non-
parametric Local Regression (LOESS) to estimate the conditional mean of party support for
each level of employment. This method fits models to subsets of the data using weighted least
squares to give greater weight to values near the point being estimated for. The figures plot
the conditional means obtained using this method along the dashed line, giving us a visual
representation of the relationship. In the top left cell we can see support for Fidesz plotted
against employment share. The curve shows a generally negative trend, although it is not par-
ticularly clear. The top right cell looks at support for Jobbik. The curve here is reasonably flat,
though the relationship could be negative or slightly non-linear. The bottom cell looks at the
MSZP. Here the relationship appears negative when looking at the curve, however the observa-
tions are dispersed very widely around it and the negative relationship appears to be a weak one.








































Figure 2.5: Smoothing functions
2.6 Results
Here we consider the results obtained from estimating the models above and consider their
implications. Tables 2.1 to 2.4 show the results obtained from our OLS regressions. Table 2.1
shows the results of OLS regressions looking at the determinants of support for both populist
parties together. Our results show no effect of employment share on the share of respondents
claiming to support a populist party. The only significant variable in this model is the share of
devoutly religious respondents. This fits with the findings in the previous literature, which show
a relationship between religious values and support for socially conservative parties in Hungary.
In table 2.2 we can see the determinants of support for Fidesz. We do not find any significant
effect of unemployment on support for Fidesz. We do find some significant effects however, the
most consistent of these being the effect of religious denomination. The sign is as hypothesised,
with regions housing larger religious communities showing greater support for Fidesz, as would
be expected from the previous discussion. We also find significant effects of secondary and
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tertiary education. Again, both coefficients give the effect on support for Fidesz relative to
only receiving primary education. We find that support for Fidesz increases with the level of
education. We can interpret this in terms of the previous discussion of the politics of class in
Hungary. Fidesz is closely associated with the anti-communist movement of the late 1980’s and
has promoted itself as the party of the entrepreneurial middle class (Fehervary, 2011). As a
result it follows that more educated white-collar workers will support Fidesz.
In table 2.3 we can see the determinants of support for Jobbik. We do not find any signif-
icant effect of employment share on support for Jobbik. Overall we don’t actually find any
significant effects at all. This suggests that support for Jobbik is primarily determined by fac-
tors outside of our model. This fits with the findings of Karacsony and Rona (2011), who show
that the popularity of Jobbik is closely related to relations between Hungarian and minority
groups - especially the Roma- as well as media coverage of clashes between these groups.
In table 2.4 we can see the determinants of support for the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP).
Yet again we do not find any significant effect of employment share. We find a large though
weakly significant effect of immigration into the regions, with higher immigration into a region
being associated with higher support for the MSZP. This may be due to migrants primarily
moving to urban areas, where the MSZP typically have their strongholds. This idea is sup-
ported by the small but significant relationship between support for the MSZP and population
density. We also find a small, weakly significant effect of secondary education, with support for
the MSZP falling as a region’s citizens gain secondary education. As discussed earlier in the
context of table 2.2, this effect of education may reflect class and occupational dynamics.
As noted earlier, we have reason to believe that our OLS estimates will not allow us to make
causal inferences about the relationship between employment and political outcomes. To re-
cap, these are... Consequently, we have estimated 2SLS models using the Bartik instrument
to obtain exogenous variation in unemployment. The instrument uses the sectoral composition
of each region to predict changes in labour demand due to the region’s exposure to national
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level growth within each of the relevant industries. Variation in the predicted unemployment
values should therefore be unrelated to other regional characteristics.
Table 2.12 in appendix C shows the first stage equations as specified in the previous sec-
tion. In these regressions time and region dummies are included but omitted from the results
tables shown here. Table 2.13 shows the first stage regressions when region and time dummies
were not included. In table 2.12 the Bartik instrument is positively related with employment
and is significant at the 1% level. However the coefficient is small. Another problem is that
the F-Statistic is small below the Stock and Yogo rule-of-thumb of 10, meaning that the instru-
ment is weak. When region and time dummies were excluded from the model, the first stage
results showed the instrument to be strong. The Bartik instrument is comprised of regional
compositions and year specific growth. The effectiveness of the Bartik instrument may be lost
due to the fact that the dummy variables largely control for the variation that it is made up
of, especially given the regional and time period we are considering here. We observe the same
difference between results with and without dummies when looking at the results obtained
when using initial industry shares in tables 2.16 and 2.17.
Tables 2.5 to 2.8 show the second stage results of the models run. In table 2.5 we use the
2sls model to estimate the relationship between employment and support for populists over-
all. We find that here employment share actually has a positive effect on support for populist
parties. We can explain this in terms of the ’attack function’ seen in section 2. The positive
relationship may indicate that a reduction in native income (resulting from a negative employ-
ment shock) increases the perceived economic risks of a populist government by more than the
prospective gains from attacking outside groups. However, there is an issue with the first stage
F-statistics. Looking at table 2.12 we can see the first stage F-statistics are below 10 in most of
the regressions. This means that despite the coefficient on the Bartik variable being significant
at the 1% level, the instrument is still weak and will be biased towards the OLS coefficient.
There is an issue here regarding the control variables used however. When looking at table
2.13 we can see the F-statistics obtained when running the regressions without the time and
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region dummies. Here the F-statistics are typically above 16, which going by the Cragg-Donald
measure indicates a strong instrument. In table 2.15 we can see the results obtained when
running the regressions without the dummy variables. Looking at table 2.15 we can see quite
different results are obtained when running regressions without the dummies. Here there is a
significant, negative effect of employment share on support for populists, although this effect is
driven the by the effect of support for Fidesz. This can be explained in term of the gains to be
had from attacking an outside group. If employment prospects are improving for natives and
thus incomes rising, then it follows the relative gains from attacking an outside group will be
lower.
In table 2.6 we again see the determinants of support for Fidesz, estimated after instrumenting
for employment share. we do not find significant effects of employment when including the
time and region dummies. We do however, find significant coefficients for most of our control
variables and with the correct sign. A notable exception is immigration, which does not any sig-
nificant effect on support for Fidesz. This fits with Kitschelt and Bukovina’s (2009) observation
that far-right groups in Eastern Europe target native minorities as much as immigrants. When
looking at table 2.15 we can see that the effect is negative and significant with the controls
taken out. This is an interesting finding as it goes against the previous literature (see Algan
et al, 2017 and Guiso et al, 2017) which argues that adverse employment shocks will increase
support for populists. While this is true in many countries, it must be noted that in most
of the countries previously studied populists are opposition parties and thus offer alternatives
to what they portray as a failed establishment. However the result here suggests that this
relationship is not universal and that it will be reversed if populists are in government and
overseeing economic hardship.
As in the OLS results, here we also find that the number of highly religious respondents is
positively associated with support for Fidesz in a region.
Table 2.7 looks at support for Jobbik. When including the time and region dummies we can
see that support for Jobbik increases with employment. This may be a surprising result as it
reflects both an opposition party gaining from good economic improvements and a populist one
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at that. Given the aggressive nature of Jobbik’s stance towards minority groups we can inter-
pret this result as reflecting the reduced risk involved with voting for Jobbik. This means that
improvements in economic conditions may allow citizens to more weight to identity concerns
when deciding which political party to support. However in table 2.15 no effect is observed
without the time and region dummies.
We do not find any significant effects of employment on support for the MSZP in table 2.8.
We find negative effects of secondary and tertiary education shares, and a negative effect of log
GDP. Referring back to table 2.15 we see a negative effect of employment share. Similarly, we
find this negative effect when using the transformed version of the MSZP data in table 2.18,
but only when time and region dummies are omitted from the model. Looking at table 2.18
we have the results of running these regressions with the transformed MSZP data. We still
find a negative coefficient on employment share when time and region dummies are omitted,
although the coefficient is very large and likely overstating the relationship. This may reflect
the MSZP being less important as a safe option, being that it served several terms in govern-
ment and is one of the parties still surviving from the start of democracy in Hungary. However
this interpretation seems unlikely given the damage that the Global Finaicial Crisis did to the
credibility of the MSZP.
2.6.1 Individual-level results
Next we use the original, individual-level data to estimate the effect of employment on individual-
level decisions to support a political party. Here we present the results from probit regressions
using the Bartik instrument for identification.
In these individual-level regressions, the dependant variable is binary - taking the value of
1 if the individual gives party j as the party they feel closest to, and 0 otherwise. Using OLS
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































and normality assumption of OLS. This will lead to invalid standard errors thus causing hy-
pothesis tests to be unreliable. As a results the model is run here with probit models, which use
a maximum likelihood procedure to model outcomes when the dependant dependant variable
of interest is binary. The model can be written as:
Partyji = β0 + β1Employmentrt + β2GDPrt + β3Religiousi + β4Immigrationrt
+β5Secondaryi + β6Tertiaryi + β7EUfundsrt + β8λt + β9ψr + ei
(2.4)
This model closely follows that outlined in equation 1. However, as this model estimates the
relationship between employment and political choices at the individual level, data from the
European Social Survey is used at the original individual level as denote with the i subscript.
Eurostat data on regional indicators still varies by region and time period. While the instru-
ment is controlling for regional unemployment, one can argue that the level of employment in
a region is going to be strongly related to the chances of an individual in that region being
employed.
Table 2.9 presents the results of the probit regression. It should be noted that the inter-
pretation of probit coefficients in not straightforward. Due to the non-linear nature of the
probit model, the effect of a unit change in any given variable will depend on the initial value
of that variable as well as the values of the other explanatory variables (Hoetker, 2007). None
the less the results still provide information on the significance, sign and relative magnitude of
the effects of the explanatory variables.
The trends found here largely reflect those presented in tables 2.5 to 2.8. Table 2.9 shows
that higher employment share reduces the probability of an individual supporting populists.
However, looking at columns 2 and 3 of table 2.9 suggests that this result is driven entirely
by a reduced probability of supporting Fidesz, while higher employment is shown to lead to
an increased probability of the individual supporting the Jobbik party. This is a significant
departure from the model shown in tables 2.5 and 2.6 and is the result of the individual level
results showing a strong negative effect of employment on support for Fidesz, where previously
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Table 2.9: Probit results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Populist Fidesz Jobbik MSZP
Employment -7.029∗∗∗ -9.459∗∗∗ 3.391∗∗ -3.086∗∗
(1.064) (1.073) (1.646) (1.539)
Log GDP 2.148∗∗∗ 2.759∗∗∗ -0.791 0.398
(0.325) (0.330) (0.512) (0.466)
Log Pop 0.258∗∗∗ 0.371∗∗∗ -0.161∗ 0.295∗∗∗
(0.0568) (0.0586) (0.0862) (0.0827)
Log EU 0.0570 -0.0247 0.195∗∗∗ 0.0644
(0.0444) (0.0470) (0.0667) (0.0655)
Religious 0.254∗∗∗ 0.354∗∗∗ -0.272∗∗∗ -0.0686
(0.0501) (0.0510) (0.0912) (0.0757)
Migration -50.52∗∗∗ -51.60∗∗∗ -13.34 5.303
(7.488) (7.748) (11.59) (10.55)
Secondary 0.146∗∗∗ 0.0776 0.235∗∗∗ -0.0176
(0.0481) (0.0502) (0.0764) (0.0674)
Tertiary 0.164∗∗∗ 0.127∗∗ 0.171∗ -0.0127
(0.0571) (0.0595) (0.0906) (0.0794)
Constant -19.28∗∗∗ -24.02∗∗∗ 3.576 -5.833
(2.780) (2.817) (4.405) (4.007)
N 5273 5273 5273 5273
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
any effect was found to be insignificant. The negative effect on support for Fidesz is also found
when the region-level model is run without time or region dummies. As in the regional model
without time and region dummies, a higher employment rate reduced the probability of support
for the MSZP is negative. Employment is found to be a significant in each model in table 2.9.
2.7 Conclusion
In this paper we have examined several theories about economic hardship and its relationship
to support for populist parties. Primarily we have looked to see if the finding that employment
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leads to increased support for populist parties applies in a setting where populists are incum-
bents rather than in opposition. This allows us to shed some light on the broader question of
whether voters support populist parties due to ideological values of as a protest against eco-
nomic mismanagement by incumbent liberal parties.
We find that support for Hungary’s populist incumbents Fidesz decreases as economic con-
ditions improve. This is an interesting finding as it runs contrary to the economic voting
hypothesis of Duch and Stevenson (2008), who argue that voters reward governments for good
economic circumstances. It does support the findings of previous literature on populism, which
predicts that support for populist parties is negatively related to employment (Algan et al,
2017; Dehdari, 2017). This suggests that support for populists has been driven by protest
against liberal incumbent parties instead of positive evaluations of how populist parties would
manage the economy.
However, looking at the Jobbik party makes it harder to draw this conclusion. We find weak
evidence that support for Jobbik is positively related with the level of employment. We have
interpreted this in terms of the role of risk of inter-group competition. Previous work sug-
gests that identity and attitudes to minorities have driven the growth of Jobbik since 2006
(Karacsony and Rona, 2011). We interpret our positive coefficient as reflecting a lower risk or
opportunity cost to supporting a populist outsider when economic conditions are more stable.
This would suggest that the appeal of Jobbik lies in its appeals to culture and identity, however
citizen’s decisions to support the party will be shaped by the economic environment. If this
is the case then there is not a duality between cultural and economic explanations of the rise
of populism, rather economic factors may determine the importance of culture and identity in
citizens political evaluations.
The setting of Hungary is informative but does not allow us to distinguish between far-right
populists and and any other type of populist party. Future research could focus in the case of
Greece, where a radical left party governed from 2015 to 2019. Furthermore, the last year has
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seen Hungary lose its unique status as the only country in Europe with a populist government.
In this time Italy, Austria and Poland have elected right-wing populist parties or coalitions
thereof. Future survey data from these countries will allow us to see if the findings obtained
here are specific to Hungary, or if we are observing a general trend in the support for incumbent
populists and if they apply to mature democracies.
The results of the 2019 European Parliament election highlight the changing nature of politic in
Europe and the need to understand the drivers of political preferences among voters.Not only
did the main centre-left and centre-right parties (Socialists & Democrats and European People’s
Party respectively) lose seats - along with their dominant role in the parliament- the Alliance
of Liberal Democrats and the Greens both saw significant gains in seats (BBC, 2019). At the
same time the populist and nationalist parties (Europe of Nations & Freedom and Europe of
Freedom and Democracy) also saw moderate gains. Research into how economic conditions
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Appendices
Appendix A: Summary Statistics
Table 2.10: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev.
Fidesz Support 0.199 0.101
Jobbik Support 0.057 0.038
MSZP Support 0.057 0.037
Employment 0.36 0.104
Log GDP 9 0.331
Log EU 6.845 0.59










Industry (excluding construction) 2
Construction 4
Retail and Hospitality 5
Information and Communication 6
Finance and Insurance 7
Real Estate 8
Professional and Scientific 9
Public administration 10
Arts and Entertainment 11
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Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2.15: 2sls results, without controls
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Populist Fidesz Jobbik MSZP
Employment -2.784∗∗∗ -3.182∗∗∗ 0.398 -0.632∗∗
(1.074) (1.021) (0.340) (0.301)
Log GDP 0.697∗∗∗ 0.776∗∗∗ -0.0794 0.0767
(0.265) (0.252) (0.0837) (0.0744)
Log EU 0.0126 0.00143 0.0112 -0.00285
(0.0329) (0.0313) (0.0104) (0.00923)
Log Population 0.112∗∗ 0.123∗∗∗ -0.0112 0.0511∗∗∗
(0.0499) (0.0475) (0.0158) (0.0140)
Religious 0.261 0.297∗ -0.0359 -0.0187
(0.188) (0.179) (0.0594) (0.0528)
Migration -13.89∗∗∗ -10.54∗∗ -3.359∗∗ 1.955
(5.375) (5.109) (1.699) (1.508)
Secondary -0.0726 0.0343 -0.107 -0.0810
(0.229) (0.217) (0.0723) (0.0642)
Tertiary 0.147 0.156 -0.00886 0.0562
(0.292) (0.277) (0.0922) (0.0818)
Constant -5.669∗∗∗ -6.330∗∗∗ 0.662 -0.590
(2.182) (2.075) (0.690) (0.612)
Observations 60 60 60 60
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
102Chapter 2. Employment and Support for Populists in an Illiberal State: Evidence from Hungary
Table 2.16: 2sls, Initial Shares, With Controls
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Populist Fidesz Jobbik MSZP
Employment 4.762 1.768 2.994∗∗ 2.052
(3.450) (2.538) (1.405) (1.573)
Log GDP -0.317 -0.197 -0.120 -0.250∗
(0.283) (0.208) (0.115) (0.129)
Log EU -0.229∗∗ -0.179∗∗ -0.0503 0.0167
(0.104) (0.0764) (0.0423) (0.0474)
Log Population -2.835∗∗ -1.742∗ -1.092∗ -0.302
(1.421) (1.045) (0.579) (0.648)
Religious 0.485∗∗∗ 0.468∗∗∗ 0.0170 -0.0560
(0.138) (0.102) (0.0563) (0.0630)
Migration 2.120 2.733 -0.613 4.097
(5.740) (4.222) (2.339) (2.618)
Secondary 0.255 0.350∗∗∗ -0.0947 -0.184∗∗
(0.159) (0.117) (0.0648) (0.0725)
Tertiary 0.437∗ 0.391∗∗ 0.0465 -0.209∗
(0.235) (0.173) (0.0959) (0.107)
Constant 24.42∗∗ 16.08∗∗ 8.341∗ 3.591
(11.00) (8.093) (4.482) (5.017)
First Stage F 8.71 8.71 8.71 8.71
Observations 60 60 60 60
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Appendix C: First Stage Regressions Results (Tables 12-14)
Appendix D: 2sls results, without controls (Table 15)
Appendix E-2sls results using initial industry shares (Tables 16 & 17)
Appendix F- Transformed MSZP data (Table 18)
Appendix G- Industry growth
hp Please see appendix B for industries corresponding to x-axis labels.
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Table 2.17: 2sls results, Initial shares, No Cons
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Populist Fidesz Jobbik MSZP
Employment -2.789∗∗∗ -3.147∗∗∗ 0.359 -0.619∗∗
(1.049) (0.992) (0.328) (0.293)
Log GDP 0.698∗∗∗ 0.768∗∗∗ -0.0702 0.0737
(0.260) (0.245) (0.0810) (0.0726)
Log EU 0.0126 0.00141 0.0112 -0.00286
(0.0329) (0.0311) (0.0103) (0.00920)
Log Population 0.112∗∗ 0.122∗∗∗ -0.00987 0.0507∗∗∗
(0.0494) (0.0467) (0.0154) (0.0138)
Religious 0.261 0.299∗ -0.0383 -0.0179
(0.188) (0.177) (0.0586) (0.0525)
Migration -13.90∗∗∗ -10.48∗∗ -3.424∗∗ 1.976
(5.364) (5.070) (1.674) (1.499)
Secondary -0.0726 0.0346 -0.107 -0.0809
(0.229) (0.216) (0.0714) (0.0640)
Tertiary 0.148 0.154 -0.00582 0.0552
(0.291) (0.275) (0.0909) (0.0814)
Constant -5.678∗∗∗ -6.265∗∗∗ 0.587 -0.566
(2.139) (2.022) (0.668) (0.598)
First Stage F 19.72 19.72 19.72 19.72
Observations 60 60 60 60
Standard errors in parentheses
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Figure 2.6: Industry Growth 2008-2010
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Log GDP 1.724 -9.461∗∗
(2.104) (3.909)
Log EU -0.0561 -0.0301
(0.261) (1.426)












First Stage F 18.46 7.93
Observations 60 60
Standard errors in parentheses
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Figure 2.8: Industry Growth 2012-2014
Conclusion
July 15, 2019
In this thesis we have seen that there are is indeed a two-way relationship
between the functioning of political and economic institutions. We have seen
that when bureaucratic institutions do not function effectively and bribes are
frequently extorted then firms are deterred from investing and from providing
secure employment. The mechanism through which this works is uncertainty,
with corrupt agreements not offering any of the legal protections that firms need
in order to plan forwards. This will be detrimental to the growth prospects of
the polity. If frequent corruption affects the type of employment that firms
provide then this means that tackling corruption will also be an important part
of anti-poverty efforts. These findings also suggest that anti-corruption policies
that penalise firms may further deter investment, as the penalties incurred if a
corrupt agreement comes to light will further increase the risks involved. This
suggests that policies should focus on incentivising the behaviour of bureaucrats
more than that of firms.
We have also seen that employment shocks can affect political outcomes and
help determine the level of support enjoyed by populist parties. In looking at
Hungary we have been able to observe the effect of employment levels on an
incumbent populist party and opposition parties. Our findings run contrary to
previous findings in the literature. Firstly we find that support for the populist
incumbent falls as employment levels rise. The economic voting hypothesis
would lead us to expect that as employment conditions improve incumbents
should be rewarded for their handling of the economy. This seems particularly
pertinent here as the Fidesz party have governed Hungary throughout its recov-
ery from the Great Recession. We also find that support for the largest liberal
party in Hungary the MSZP, also falls as employment shares increase. I inter-
pret this in terms of the risks associated with supporting new or inexperienced
political parties. We can see this in the weak, though positive relationship be-
tween employment and support for the populist opposition Jobbik party.This
interpretation runs quite contrary to the dynamics often credited with driving
support for populists in western Europe, where populist parties are seen as a
protest option against established political elites.
There do not appear to be any obvious policy implications of these findings.
However, given the rise of populist governments in Europe the findings here
1
may help predict political events outside of Hungary.
2
